

Y^e COHORN CARAVAN

The Knox Expedition In The Winter of 1775 - 76

by

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This work is dedicated to the memory of my father, Harold B. Bowne, who knew more about history and the really significant lessons to be learned therefrom than any other person I have ever known.

Wm. L. Bowne

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INTRODUCTION

The following material is the result of an extensive study of the Knox Papers and Diary microfilms as maintained in the archives of the Massachusetts Historical Society. This study was undertaken as the result of complete dissatisfaction with the available books and summaries I encountered when I endeavored to trace the path of the Knox Trail from Ticonderoga to Boston and found that there were both disputes between various community groups and unknown places which previous writers had failed to try to identify by their modern names.

Insofar as possible, I have followed the original writings by Henry Knox. In this regard it is probably fortunate that I did not encounter the earlier transcription of his diary as originally published in "The Sexagenary" until I was so far along in my own transcription that I decided to stay with my own efforts instead of relying on someone else's. As a result, I have found a number of minor instances where the earlier transcriber changed words to make them fit what he thought some almost indecipherable words or phrases should say. Admittedly, these are minor, but I believe future researchers will benefit by the indication that the original source is still the best wherever it can be found. In some instances, which I have tried to indicate very clearly, I have had to rely on portions of that earlier transcription to fill gaps that represent completely missing pages of the diary. However, where I am uncertain about the correct word or phrase because of the crude writing, I have tried to indicate this by parentheses and question marks to encourage others to continue this research.

All quoted material is given in its entirety except where the parts of a letter have so little bearing as to be utterly irrelevant. In those few places, the deletion is clearly indicated and mentioned in the accompanying discussion. When I have had to rely on secondary sources, I have made these references very clear and have avoided as far as possible any presentation that might make these seem to have the same authenticity as a direct quotation of Knox's own words. When I have had to interrupt a quotation for any reason, the next section continues from where the last ceased, and it should be noted that I have not omitted any part for the benefit of making a point of my own choosing. This was one of the major objections I found with the works of too many predecessors or the sources they were forced to rely upon.

I am indebted to many local historians and both the Massachusetts and New York Bicentennial Commissions for their guidance and encouragement in compiling this work. Some who offered special help were Mr. Paul Rayno, Historian for the Town of Kingsbury, Mr. Walter V. Miller, Historian of Columbia County, Mr. John DuPont of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation and formerly with the N.Y.S. Department of Education for whom he prepared an extensive review of the Knox Trail which was helpful in cross-checking my data after I had completed my own transcriptions, Mr. Richard Allen of the Office of State History who was both a great encouragement and assistance in identifying

places which were known by other names in Knox's time. My daughter, Arlyce T. Bowne, and her friend Martha Krow, graduate students at Harvard University, should be mentioned for their assistance in locating data and maps in the Boston and Cambridge, Mass., area.

This material was organized originally as my own notes, but at the urging of some of my advisors who believed that it should be offered in its entirety for future scholars, it is presented as both my direct transcription of Knox papers and memoranda, and my own conclusions based on that data. In some instances I indicate agreement with others, and in some I disagree. Others are invited to do the same -- hopefully on the same kind of direct investigation on their own parts.

At one point some thought was given to separating all the direct transcriptions of Knox's own writings and related letters from his associates in one part, and placing all discussion in another with only footnote numbering to relate the parts. This was rejected in favor of keeping the discussions and the quotations together to eliminate the annoyance of having to turn pages back and forth in a constant dance of frustration -- something that has always discouraged my own reading of so much scholarly historic work. However, if anyone does wish to read the direct transcriptions taken from the microfilms without interruption, he need only go from one indented section to the next. With little exception, he will find this gives him the data in chronological order.

One of my mentors suggested that I publish this "with lots and lots of pictures." In going over the ground, I did take numerous photos, but it is almost impossible to show the route Knox traveled without a great deal of the modern highway and tourist attraction distractions. It was decided that the reader would be better served by providing maps, especially where it might be possible to correlate data from Knox's time onto modern maps that one can use to trace his own way along this historic trail. Each one so inclined may then compile his own photographic record of the route as it exists in his own time. My commentary, then, will become a guide book to help each one locate the exact places mentioned by Knox as the years have changed them from names as used in his age to more common usages today. In doing this, I have chosen to use a current topographic map from the U.S. Geological Survey. This should aid future readers who might find later road maps changed again from what they are at the time I assembled this data. In doing this, I am impressed by the fact that so little of this has been done in the two hundred years that have elapsed, and then largely only on a local level by individuals who are concerned only with their own communities. The result has been numerous disputes and misunderstandings that might have been avoided had the changes been properly noted when they occurred. If I have erred in this, I trust this will only serve to inspire those who can prove better facts to come forward and offer their own data for consideration.

Schenectady, N.Y.
December, 1974

Wm. L. Bowne

YE COHORN CARAVAN

I The Man

The dictionary defines a cohorn thus:

"cohorn: a small bronze mortar mounted on a wooden block with handles and used for throwing light shells; from Baron Menno van Coehoorn, 1704 Dutch engineer, its inventor."

Strictly speaking, cohorns were only a small portion of the selection of guns that Knox carried from Ticonderoga to Boston in the winter of 1775-76, and while he is somewhat more meticulous in compiling the inventory, we find instances on the other hand in which he tends to lump all the guns under the term as a generic title for artillery. In one such list, he summarizes:

42 Cannon of different sizes
16 Mortars & Howitzers
58 Cohorns

In his other inventories, Knox lists 43 cannon for a total of 59 pieces of artillery, and in the detailed list left with his brother and which included his loading instructions, he gives the sizes and weights for a total of 119,000 pounds -- almost 60 tons -- which we can accept as the accurate list of his cargo, a respectable amount of weaponry at any time, and one which posed ample problems to men who had to move them across frozen rivers, steep mountains where roads were little more than cleared paths through woods and fields, and with nothing more than wooden sleds drawn by animals to help them and their own muscle power.

This achievement in itself gives us a basic picture of Henry Knox's personality -- that of a man who refused to let the magnitude of his task defer him from its undertaking. But it leaves us wondering what the man looked like, and what his life had been like to mold him along these lines.

There are various pictures of Knox that show us a tall man, some say about six feet in height, heavily built. This indicates a man taller than most, and stocky in proportion for an era when people tended to add weight as a natural insulation to supplement the crude heating of their homes and the reliance on natural fibres for their clothing. In spite of his weight, he does not appear to have been unattractive, and we are told that he was personable when one met him for the first time. His pictures do indicate that he kept his left hand at least partly concealed, and some writers report that he was very self-conscious about having lost two fingers from that hand in a shooting accident as a teenager -- some say while

PROLOGUE

By the fall of 1775, the battle for Colonial rights under England's Magna Charta was in danger of collapse. Most American participants did not yet recognize their fight as a revolution. What had started in April as a resistance to seizure by only partially organized Colonial Militia volunteers had grown almost literally over night to a state of military siege against the British forces in Boston.

With one abortive attempt by the Royal Army to break out on the land side, the engagement had sunk to a game of "sit and wait". This was a game the English could afford to play. As long as supply ships could enter the harbor unimpeded, the troops could sit tight and exhaust the patience of the undisciplined Americans. The colonists could not long sustain this kind of operation. If the British were to win by default, the Americans would abandon all hope.

But how could the British be forced to surrender their position? Only by making it untenable. To do this, the siege had to become effective on all sides. Lacking a fleet capable of an effective blockade against the might of the British Navy, this meant heavy guns -- artillery -- of sufficient range to make the harbor too dangerous for large ships and impossible for small boats to ferry in the needed quantity of supplies.

This is the story of how the needed armament was brought to Boston in time to save the Revolution and raise a minor resistance movement to the status of THE WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE.

hunting, but others insist it was while firing a cannon in the artillery company he had joined to supplement his book knowledge with some practical experience.

Henry Knox also fulfills the description of a "self-made man." We are told that his father was a shipmaster sailing out of Boston, but unlike most shipmasters of the time, he was a dreamer with a wanderlust, always in search of an utopia which he never found. Knox himself did not write much about his boyhood. As a result we are dependent upon others for much of this information, which may be influenced by romantic inclinations to elaborate the facts to produce certain desired impressions. However, it does seem that Knox's father did not send back as much money as his family needed, yet their friends and neighbors held rather limited views as to what would be "suitable" employment for a lady of the social class in which Mrs. Knox was considered to belong. Thus it appears that the Knox family subsisted in that peculiar economic state known as "genteel poverty", dependent upon the charity of friends who would rather contribute something to their support than see Mrs. Knox employed in most of the types of work open to women in that time, especially as those that were considered "acceptable" could not provide enough to let the family eke out a decent existence.

We are told that Henry was the seventh of ten brothers, but one of only four who survived childhood. By the time the American Revolution broke out, we only hear about his younger brother, William, leaving us in doubt about the other two survivors. When we are further informed that Henry became a book store proprietor's apprentice at the age of nine to help support his family, and then that his father died while on a voyage when Henry was only twelve, we begin to understand more fully just how serious this conflict between economic deprivation and recognized social position must have been in Boston over 200 years ago. Fortunately, most of the English colonies in America provided a basic education so that literacy was almost if not entirely (100%) established -- more than one could say for England itself -- and as abbreviated as Henry Knox's formal education might have been, it did provide him with a working basis in the "three Rs" before he went to work. He was also fortunate to be apprenticed to a family friend who encouraged him to apply this knowledge to studying the books in the shop in his free time. It has been noted that Knox was one of the few (some say the only) American officer who could read, write, and speak in French as well as English, and that this, like most of his unusual skills, was derived from books. We cannot help but feel that the speaking part at least must have been mastered with the help of Huguenot neighbors such as Paul Revere.

All this left its mark on Knox. As we read his letters and notes, we get the psychological picture of a man who has learned to cater to those who can help him. At the same time, he displays an over-optimism about his own abilities on many occasions, yet he has a tendency to imply an exaggeration of his achievements, even when they are great enough without any enlargement. Although

inclined to fawn upon those he admired, Knox also shows a tendency to be critical and opinionated toward those who failed to achieve as much with equal or, in his view, better opportunities at their disposal. It was characteristic of him that, when he decided to join the Masonic Lodge, he chose the one which most of the upper levels of Boston society favored, the First Lodge, where he would meet the members of the Royal Government and be accepted by them as an equal. Yet most of his friends and customers were young Harvard students and graduates, and their professors, most of whom would be aptly described as the "campus Radicals" of their time and who belonged to St. Andrews Lodge that met at the Green Dragon Tavern. Lacking a formal education to match theirs, his acquired knowledge made him feel at home with these men, and their rebellious outlook appealed to his subconscious resentments.

Knox may not have realized how much he resented his youthful poverty, but he was not unappreciative of the kindness his bookstore mentor had shown him. It is reported that, after the death of his benefactor, that man's widow found herself in the same straits that the Knox family had suffered, and Henry did not stint in his efforts to do for her as he would for his own mother. But rebellious he was, and the young (and old) revolutionists of Boston found his shop another meeting place where their interest in books could justify their visits.

It is no surprise that his association with these known radicals would make Lucy Flucker's parents look askance on young Knox as a suitor for their daughter's hand. Nevertheless, Lucy found the bright and impressive young book dealer just what she wanted in a husband, and with the reluctant consent of her father who, as Royal Secretary for the Colony of Massachusetts, was an ardent Loyalist, she soon married the Whig merchant. No doubt Knox's membership in First Lodge served as a mitigating circumstance to soften the father's reluctance.

Thus we glean an image of the man who undertook to provide Washington with the artillery needed to drive the British out of Boston. A tall, impressive, personable young man, but one so determined that he never let himself be stopped by the adversities of nature. Like the bee who does not know he cannot fly, he goes ahead and succeeds anyhow.

THE GUNS

On the 19th of April, 1775, the unrest which had been an undercurrent throughout the Colonies for several years, constantly stirred by the avowed trouble makers of whom Samuel Adams was the unquestioned leader, broke out in open warfare. There had been earlier clashes, but to the disappointment of those who really wanted a violent revolution, each had been followed by a period in which tempers were allowed to cool. The Battle of Lexington and Concord was different.

The first shot at Lexington Common was no worse -- in fact less in itself -- than any earlier clash. By now, many wonder whether it was even a real shot or merely a blank charge. Even the immediate consequence -- the exchange of shots which killed several of the American militiamen -- was no more serious than the Boston Massacre a few years before, and in this case there was no question of whether the British had fired on an unarmed mob. Captain Parker's company had mustered under arms before dawn, and they were just breaking up when the British under Pitcairn arrived. But the British marched on to Concord where the Provincial Congress had established itself after being driven out of Boston, and where the bulk of the scant military supplies for the Massachusetts colonists were stored. It was the British intent to see that these few munitions were taken or destroyed, and the Americans had no intention of letting either event happen.

The supplies were safely removed by the time the British soldiers arrived, but the Minutemen of the militia gathered in force to divert the Royal troops from a more extensive search, and the second skirmish of the battle ensued. Here the first British soldiers fell, victims of rebel shots. But this skirmish did not end with one side or the other being driven off. The British found themselves harassed each dogged step all the way back to Boston.

In the meantime, messengers sped forth to the other Colonies. Within hours an army of sorts -- little more than an angry, armed mob of farmers led by old militiamen who had served their apprenticeship in the Colonial Wars -- was gathering in Cambridge, Roxbury, and at Dorchester to hem in the British in Boston. It created a stand-off. The English could sail in and out of Boston with impunity, but they could not move effectively against the landside held by the Americans. The American forces lacked the means of blockading the British completely or driving them out of the city because they had no heavy guns to reach far enough against ships or the city itself. The few light field pieces they had only aided in preventing a real sally by the Royal troops.

The army that gathered around Boston was in constant turmoil. It was made up largely of farmers or those whose businesses catered to the farmers. They came from all the nearby Colonies -- New Hampshire, Rhode Island, even the more western parts of

Connecticut -- as well as Massachusetts (which then included what is now Maine). But spring was also drawing near. Crops would have to be planted or there would be no food, and if the British could not be driven out of the city, the whole effort would have been in vain and fall would find the besiegers worse off than the besieged. Only ample military equipment, including heavy guns, could equip the army to do this. Money did not exist in sufficient amount to purchase supplies. But there was a source -- if it could be secured. The old soldiers who had fought the French in northern New York recalled the Bastion of the North -- the mighty fortress at Ticonderoga, which now stood as a supply point manned only by a caretaker force for the winter. If this could be seized before the aroused English could reinforce the troops there, those supplies -- whatever they were -- might arm the American army which now had little more than hunting guns, some powder, and a lot of spirit to sustain it.

The Provincial Congress of Massachusetts instituted two plans. Accepting the voluntary offer of the Connecticut Militia Captain, Arnold, to lead an expedition against Ticonderoga, it commissioned him a Colonel in the Massachusetts Militia and authorized him to raise a force of 400 volunteers. It also directed its old soldier, Col. Richard Gridley (who was also a Grand Master of Masons in Massachusetts) to erect fortifications to threaten Boston from the nearby heights. This maneuver would lead to the mutually disastrous Battle of Bunker Hill (on Breed's Hill), but it would also pave the way for the eventual forcing of the British to evacuate Boston.

Colonel Arnold had barely started to assemble his expeditionary force when word arrived that the obstreperous Green Mountain Boys, under their outlaw (in New York) leaders Ethan Allen and Seth Warner, were gathering additional volunteers from the western Massachusetts and Connecticut hills for the same purpose. Hastening westward with his small contingent, Arnold caught up with Allen's band near Fair Haven, about two-thirds the way from their favorite meeting place at the Catamount Tavern in Bennington to their goal. Presenting his orders as his authority, Arnold demanded that the frontiersmen either submit to his leadership or desist from their questionably legal effort. To Allen this was a joke. What was "legal" about any armed revolution? And he had obtained some sort of authority himself from Connecticut. Daring Arnold to try to command his Green Mountain "Army", Allen watched Arnold's discomfort. But then realizing that valuable time was being lost and that there was some merit in having the authority of Massachusetts, the largest colony, behind him if he ran into trouble with New York, Allen broke the impasse by consenting to "allow" Arnold to join him as co-commander. They pushed on toward their destination in the dark of night.

On reaching the edge of the lake near the opposite shore from the fort, the motley little attack force found a boat by which they could ferry a few men at a time across the narrow waterway. They had barely transferred a fifth of their number to the western shore

when the first hint of light of the morning of the 10th of May warned them that they would have to assault the fort with the men they had ferried or lose their sole advantage -- surprise. The attack was a greater success than any had hoped. Without bloodshed, the fort and all its supplies -- including a welcome wine cellar -- was in their hands within minutes.

Two days later, Seth Warner, also a Mason and member of Union Lodge #1 of Albany, led a detachment north to Crown Point, eight miles away, where they had a like success in capturing Fort Amherst. Arnold then asked for volunteers and, contrary to the implication of Allen's remark about trying to lead his Green Mountain Boys, got a strong response. Under his direction, they gathered all the available boats in the vicinity, including Major Skene's fine schooner, and set off in an amphibious assault against St. Johns beyond the other end of the lake. Once again their attack was a great success, but Arnold was well aware that this outpost was too deep into enemy territory to be held. They proceeded to load supplies and prisoners aboard their little fleet and sped back to Ticonderoga.

In spite of the fact that both Allen and Arnold were Masons, a story persists that they were in constant argument, supported in part by the fact that Allen merely mentioned that Arnold was "present", but giving no more details in the report. Arnold is said to have left at last in a huff, heading home to Connecticut rather than Boston. The fact that Arnold's wife died shortly after his arrival there raises a question -- did he leave in a huff? Or did he receive an urgent call to return to her side for the last moments? Perhaps the supposed disagreement between the rough Vermont rebel and the more formal militia officer has been enlarged upon by those who have since found the name of Benedict Arnold so distasteful that they can see nothing good in his earlier career. Arnold did argue with many other officers, and often with good cause. John Brown, who was later killed at the Battle of Stone Arabia when over-run by the Indian and Tory force of Brant and Sir John Johnson with ten times his number of men, was one of the Green Mountain Boy force at the taking of Ticonderoga. Later he would have his own dispute with Arnold and verge on insubordination in his comments against the older man, but his death concealed many of the details and one cannot help but wonder to what extent he might have been influenced by his Green Mountain associates in his views.

Regardless of these disputes -- regardless of the fact that Allen's reports first stirred consternation among many in the Continental Congress who feared that he had opened a hornet's nest between the Hampshire Grant frontiersmen, the Massachusetts authorities, and the New Yorkers (so much so that they even considered returning the fort to the British rather than get involved in further colonial dissension), much needed supplies had been captured, and we can be pretty well assured that Samuel and John Adams, the Boston cousins who were major leaders in the separation movement, were not about to let anyone give back these munitions to the British or let them go unattended and unused by the Americans.

Many who recite the story of Knox's expedition to move these guns from Ticonderoga to Boston insist that the idea to do so came from Knox himself. In view of the effort to secure the fort and the ensuing controversy, we must believe that Washington well knew the availability of the equipment. It is only a matter of understanding why he selected Knox to undertake the transport. Possibly Knox did make the suggestion at some time, but we cannot deduce that this found Washington unaware of the supply. On the other hand, Knox by that time was a daily visitor, and the suggestion would only have offered Washington the thought that this would be a good test of what sort of man he was recommending for a Colonelcy. In a time when not even blood brothers could agree on the question of loyalty to the King or faithfulness to their ideals and their land -- when $\frac{1}{3}$ of the people wanted to shuck off the domination of a monarch living far across the sea while another $\frac{1}{3}$ were equally ready to fight to prove it was the critics rather than the King who were wrong, this charming young man with an equally pleasing wife who was the daughter of the Royal Secretary, and who was himself a member of the Lodge to which most of the Loyalists belonged, might well prove to be an insidious Tory agent; or he might be the Patriot his supporters claimed, but with more promise than real ability.

Washington's arrival in Cambridge in the summer of 1775 found him with an army which did not seem to even know that it had been designated by the Congress as THE CONTINENTAL ARMY. The number was reported to be about 30,000, but one began to wonder if this were true when each day seemed to show new faces and old ones disappeared. There was leadership, but not what Washington expected in a military organization -- it was informal, consisting of too many old French and Indian War veterans who were feeling their years, and too many officers who were chosen by drum head elections for their popularity, who could be demoted just as fast. With no regular rules for military discipline, the only discipline was whatever the Masonic volunteers could muster. With no money to speak of, farmer militiamen worried as much about getting their crops planted, tended, and eventually harvested. Worst of all, there were no supplies to arm the city lads who had no such worries, and what munitions there were were mostly so far away as to be but a dream to the army that needed them.

If this story has begun to sound like a Masonic history, it is only because this was the one common ground that Washington had to hold the loyalty of his fledgling army as he began the distasteful job of setting up rules and enforcing discipline that was entirely alien to these freedom loving New Englanders. Without this, the southern aristocratic planter would have found his efforts inciting a more violent mutiny against him, his authority, and the Continental Congress than any rebellious attitude so far displayed against the King and any of his Royal Governors. The entire principle of American Rights and Freedom -- the whole Revolution -- would have gone down the drain. Few historians have ever seemed to understand or appreciate the importance of the Masonic Order in

the creation of the United States. Possibly this is because Masonry arrived here from England and Masons were on both sides of the dispute. It may stem in part from the fact that any non-Masons who have seen some of the old minutes of meetings find them lacking any of the great "mysteries" which tradition has attached to the Society, but instead showing the most dull and uninteresting comments on brethren being called to order, voting on routine business, and then relaxing from labor to refreshment. But Masonry did provide the same stable fraternity for the common man and his leaders that the Catholic Church, which fostered the Society in the days of the practicing Masons who built the great cathedrals and gave them the principles of morality and good conscience, created for its priests and lay brothers through the use of Latin and a ritualized Mass. In a land where one Colony was still largely English, another Dutch, and through them all a leavening of French Huguenots, the Masonic Lodge provided a uniform basis that surpassed any language, religious sectarianism, or even ethnic differences.

Washington would use it as a basis for deciding whom to trust when there was little else to guide him. Men like the Irish Stark and Sullivan would be found within its brotherhood along with sages like Franklin and Scots like John Paul Jones. Knox, too, would find the commonality of the brotherhood an aid in his great task, although true to their belief that the principles of Masonry are a guiding light and not a means for excluding anyone from equal treatment, none of them would ever write about this in terms which would so much as imply the benefits they found in such membership.

THE ASSIGNMENT

It was not quite four years after Henry Knox opened his own bookstore that fighting broke out between the British and Americans at Lexington and Concord. Although urged by Lucy's parents to declare his Loyalty to the King -- and to have done so would have found him with the protection of both Flucker and his lodge brothers in the Royal government -- Knox felt too strongly about the American cause to take advantage of this opportunity. Inevitably, his close association with the Adams cousins, Revere, Warren, and other revolutionaries placed him in a precarious position of risking arrest himself. Quietly one night, he and Lucy slipped off to journey out of Boston without bidding farewell to any of their Loyalist friends or her family. They made their way out to the Whig dominated suburbs and took up residence at the home of a Mr. Pelham. Later, when the activity around Boston made the situation seem a bit more hazardous, Henry would send Lucy further to Worcester where she would be safe if the British made a determined effort to break out of Boston.

It would seem that Knox's artillery company was not an active unit in the Colonial militia gathering around Boston, although individuals might well have taken the same stand as Henry. At any rate, as Col. Gridley began construction of entrenchments and redoubts across Boston Neck at Roxbury and on the neighboring headlands, Knox was faced with having to either remain idle and out of the excitement or serve as a civilian volunteer with special skills. He chose the latter course, and took charge of building a portion of the breastworks. Although most of his correspondence in this period seems to have concentrated on settling his business affairs, he did occasionally comment on ensuing events such as the Battle at Breeds Hill and from time to time about the sporadic cannonading from the British troops in Boston. He seems to have enjoyed the excitement, feeling that there was little actual danger to himself at the time.

Shortly after taking command of the disorganized army, Washington set out on an inspection tour of the lines. It is reported that Knox was standing by his own construction, and although most deeply impressed by the tall figure of the Commander-in-Chief, he kept his head well enough to realize that in matters of fortifications, Washington was more of an amateur than himself; the man he had to impress with his engineering skill was General Charles Lee, the former British officer who, after the French and Indian War, had retired to a Virginia plantation. This professional soldier and Horatio Gates, a similar retiree, had accompanied Washington to volunteer their services to the Continental Congress and had come along to Cambridge to form the cadre staff for the Commander. Nevertheless, the two tall men -- one a veteran of the French and Indian Wars and an aristocratic southern planter, the other a young, quite personable but still rather brash young bookstore operator

seeking to establish himself in this new Continental Army -- impressed each other quite favorably.

The young civilian, seeking commissions for himself and his brother, soon became a daily visitor at Washington's headquarters. The Knox Papers microfilms reveal the problems he faced and his persistence in seeking the solution he desired. The first of these letters, addressed to his wife on the 6th, 7th, 9th and 11th of July, 1775, tell of events involving Generals Washington, Lee, Burgoyne, and others, and recount his own efforts with Lee and Washington to obtain a commission for brother "Billy".

An extract of General Orders signed by Robert Pemberton as Acting Adjutant General on 20 September 1775 directed all officers in the Army of the United Colonies to apply for their Continental Commissions by presenting their individual Colony Commissions as the basis for their claims in each case. It also set forth a procedure for applying for a commission when such state commission was not available to substantiate the claim. There seem to have been a number of the Colonial officers whose respective local governments had done little or nothing about promotions during the years since the end of the French wars, leaving their militia officers at a disadvantage in this competition for position. Many of these did not seem satisfied to accept what might be offered, therefore declined Continental Commissions and served on a temporary basis under their old status until the problems were resolved or they became so disgusted that they simply terminated their enlistments with the Continental Army and returned home under the limited term arrangements provided for militiamen.

The Knox brothers seem to have been in a limbo. William was not yet nineteen at this time -- his birthday came in September -- and seems to have had no prior status in the Colonial militia. Although Henry does not discuss his own efforts for himself in this correspondence, the fact that he did not use his former Artillery Company commission tends to indicate that he was not about to settle for anything less than high rank, and he was using every connection he had to get it. He was not so crude as to misuse his Masonic connections for this, but the fact that he had joined the socially elite First Lodge rather than the more liberal St. Andrews indicates that he had little hesitation to make Washington or anyone else in an influential position aware of his fraternity relationship if he thought it might sway them. Neither Lee nor Gates seemed to be in a position to be so influenced -- at least there seems to be no obvious records of their being Masons -- but on September 20th at Watertown, Henry wrote in part to William:

"Dear Billy

We have been about here ever since we came down -- that is, we have made Mr. Pelham's our headquarters and I everyday, have made excursions to Cambridge. Last Friday Lucy Dined at General Washington's. I have mentioned you to General Lee who tells me there will be no difficulty in getting you a commission. I shall further mention it to

General Washington and General Gates. The Artillery is the corps I would most wish you to be in and will endeavor to effect it."

At about this same time, Knox received a letter from John Adams in Philadelphia in which Adams assured Henry that he had mentioned Knox's name and character to various important people, thus revealing the extent to which Knox was employing any friendly influence at his disposal. Adams went on in his letter to ask Knox to send him summaries of the qualifications of all the officers being appointed, but especially those in gunnery and engineering. He further requested Knox to advise him whether Harvard College Library had a complete set of books on these subjects.

There is little question about the propriety of asking a former book dealer to advise on what might be considered an adequate collection of books on any subject, especially one which he has studied, but we cannot help but feel that questioning a candidate for a high rank about the qualifications of others who should be considered his competitors is like asking Henry Ford what he thinks about General Motors and Chrysler as a basis for granting a contract. Although the Knox Papers do not include anything on there having been a similar question from Washington, some writers have picked this up to report that Knox advised Washington that there were no New England officers he could recommend, and that all the good officers were southerners. Such a blanket condemnation of his friends and many lodge brothers does not seem possible. Knox well might have avoided committing himself rather than risk undercutting his own position by an over-generous recommendation, and probably he would not have avoided making any critical objection to one he did not like, but a blanket rejection, even in an effort to cater to the southerners who represented the top command at this point, just is not characteristic of Knox. He would have found a less critical way to achieve the result.

Many writers insist that the entire Ticonderoga expedition was Knox's idea, and that to a large extent this was Washington's reason for sending the young, inexperienced bookstore proprietor on this mission. We have seen that the more than 100 pieces of artillery at that fort were already known to everyone before the mission was assigned, and there is no doubt that Washington had officers who knew the region and were more experienced in military transport. Arnold, who had been there at the capture by the Green Mountain Boys, returned to Cambridge before the task was initiated, and must have reported personally what he had seen as well as what else had been brought in from Crown Point and St. Johns. Stark, Putnam, and many others had served in the French and Indian War in the Lake George region. But Knox was anxious. Knox was a daily visitor seeking commissions for himself and his brother. Washington needed to know that Knox could perform reliably under strain before he saw the high rank he was proposing for the young man conferred or before Knox's friends pushed through the Colonelcy in an act beyond Washington's control.

On the 16th of November, before Congress had acted on the commission for Henry Knox, Washington directed the finance officer to issue a draft of \$1,000 in Continental bills to finance the expedition to obtain artillery for the army in Cambridge. He issued a directive to Knox instructing him to go first to New York to see about obtaining cannon from the Provincial Congress there, and then to go on to Ticonderoga -- or even to Quebec if Arnold had captured that city by then -- to find whatever artillery was needed. He ordered Knox to maintain a record of expenses, and as an after thought, suggested that he also obtain whatever flints he could. At the same time he sent out an order to Schuyler to survey the armament at Ticonderoga to determine what could be spared for transport to Boston without too seriously risking the defenses of that fort.

Henry Knox departed from Cambridge in mid-November with a letter addressed to Governor Morris in New York, identifying him as an official on government business -- a much needed document in view of his lack of a formal military status at the moment. As he began his journey, he wrote a note to Lucy in Worcester to tell her of his task, let her know he would be seeing her in a day, and quell any fears she might have by assuring her that he would be far from any fighting. His statement that he would be going as far as "Ticonderoga about a three weeks journey" seems to be an optimistic underestimate of the time he would need, yet it can be quite justified as a reassurance to his wife that he would not be gone too long.

From time to time, Knox repeated his "three weeks" estimate, and later even shortened it, giving the impression that he had a persistent tendency to overestimate his abilities and, in some related data, overstate his achievements. This is a mild form of bragging which does not detract in the least from his actual accomplishments or the difficulties under which they were attained.

Knox does not state outright that his departure on November 16th was in the company of his brother, William, but data appearing throughout his diary and accompanying letters makes this quite apparent. On their arrival in Worcester, Knox visited with Lucy for the weekend and made arrangements for a Mr. Miller to join them. The diary entries begin on November 20th, and a monetary entry for that date shows that he gave Miller a six and two seven dollar Continental bills to leave with Mrs. Miller (a total of \$20). Other entries later leave no doubt that Miller was an active member of their party.

In reading the following quotations from both the diary and various letters that recount this expedition, one must observe that punctuation was most haphazard, capitalization was equally erratic, and paragraphs, phrases, or other divisions were either ignored or indicated by dashes. An effort has been made to duplicate as nearly as possible this writing while still using typewritten transcripts to make them legible to the reader. If one wishes to read the account without explanation or comment, he need only skip from one indented section to the next, but the interspersed data should prove helpful.

ON TO TICONDEROGA

In an earlier transcript of Knox's writings, the reporter found the handwriting and spelling techniques difficult to follow. The transcripts this author made from the microfilms will, it is hoped, surmount some of these problems and, by indicating doubtful words with parentheses and interrogation points, encourage future researchers to follow the example of studying the original writing whenever possible. By commentary, some of these matters will be indicated between indented quotations. The diary transcript begins on November 20th, 1775:

"1775

Nov. 20 Went from Worcester to go to New York
Reach'd Western that night 38 m.
21 from Western to Hartford 44 mi."

In an earlier transcription, "Western" was given as "Westward". A close examination of the writing not only shows this to be an error, but tended to make it look as though even the obvious "Western" might be an error, with the possibility that the word should have been "Westover". However, an old map by an unknown cartographer shows that there was a small township call "Western" between Brookfield and Brimfield where no village exists today. This is not quite the 38 miles Knox indicates, but it is characteristic in most of his estimates for him to overstate (rather than underestimate) the distances he actually covered.

It might be well to mention here that, although Knox makes no specific comment of seeking guns other than where he was directed to attempt to obtain them, later correspondence suggests that he must have been very dilligent. Hartford, for one, wrote later to request assurance that, if they sent the two bronze cannon promised, care would be taken to prevent any damage and that the pieces would be returned promptly after the need ended. The diary continues:

"22	from Hartford to New Haven	40
23	from New Haven to Fairfield	28
24	from Fairfield to Kingsbridge	56 miles
25	from Kingsbridge to New York	14
	Stayed at New York 26-27"	

Two points impress us about the foregoing quotation. First, this contains one of the greatest mileage overstatements in all of Knox's reporting. The village of Fairfield cited was, in those days, what is now Bridgeport rather than the present Fairfield, although the two are so close together that this is rather inconsequential. However it does emphasize the repeated tendency he has to report having traveled a greater distance than actually covered, and this is most

especially true with regard to the noted 56 miles from Fairfield to Kingsbridge -- unless the road so wound back on itself that he would have had to travel two miles to advance one all the way. A 56 miles distance from Fairfield should have put him down on Staten Island!

Even without the benefit of one of those "perpetual" calendars, the next diary entry provides us with a key to assign days to go with the noted dates. Knox indicates that his departure from New York was on a Tuesday, and in his letter to Washington on the 27th he stated that his arrival in New York was on Saturday the 25th. This enables us to determine that he spent the weekend with Lucy in Worcester, setting off on Monday the 20th to use the week in travel to New York. On the following Tuesday:

- "28th Left New York the Tuesday following and
reach'd to Croton's ferry 39½ miles
29 from Croton's ferry to Poughkeepsie 44 M
30 from Poughkeepsie to Livingston Manor 40"

At this point the microfilm in Knox's own writing shows a loss of pages prior to this technique for preserving valuable data having been applied to the Knox records. Fortunately we can use a secondary source -- an earlier transcription -- along with other letters that he wrote later to get some picture of what happened between the entries for November 30th and where the microfilm picks up again about the 9th of December. However, before leaving the microfilm data entirely, it is interesting to note that, in the section where Knox recorded his travel expenses, the part where he concluded his items for his stay in New York, contains the comment, "Glad to leave N. York it being very expensive...".

The first entry we quote from the secondary source transcription shows an error which is undoubtedly a typographical mistake. The copy gives the travel for December 1st as being from Poughkeepsie to Albany, but the stop-over of the night before as at Livingston Manor. We correct as follows:

- "Dec. 1 from Livingston Manor to Albany 40 miles
2 Stay'd at Albany
3 Rode from Albany to Saratoga 35
4 Set out about 10 O'clock, from Saratoga to
Fort George, 30 miles which place we
reach'd 2 O'clock."

It is just as well to remind the reader at this point that all references to Saratoga in these early times refer to present day Schuylerville. As present day Saratoga was being developed before the name change was made, it was consistently called Saratoga Spa or Saratoga Springs, a name which is still technically correct in spite of common usage which drops the second word.

We now find Knox at Fort George at the south end of Lake George on Monday, December 4, 1775. He has been to New York and in a long letter to General Washington on the previous Monday, November 27th, he had reported as follows:

"May it please your Excellency
I arrived here last Saturday morning & immediately made inquiry whether Col Read had done any thing in the business with which I was charg'd -- I found that his Stay had been short during which time the Committee that sat during the recess of the Congress Could not be gotten together so that he went away with out being able to forward the business in the least. Yesterday the Committee met & after having considered your excellencys Letter to them Col McDougal waited upon me & gave such reasons for not complying with the requisition of the heavy cannon as would not be prudent to put upon paper -- he has promis'd me that he will use his utmost influence in the Congress which meets tomorrow & has no doubt of success, that 12 exceeding good Iron 4 pounders with a Quantity of Shells & shot shall be sent to Camp immediately & also he promis'd the loan of two fine brass six pounders cast in a foundry in this city -- they have six -- I very sincerely wish your Excellency had been acquainted with this circumstance & charg'd me with a Commission to have had a number cast for the Camp. ..."

The balance of this letter continues with a comparison of costs and weights, suggesting that Washington may wish to send an order to McDougal to arrange for castings to be made. He expresses some doubt about getting any guns heavier than 18 pounders -- actually he obtained some up to 24 pound size -- but these arguments almost sound like a subtle pressure to have the new castings made. The rest of the letter is a report of the rumors which have arrived regarding Montgomery's progress into Canada, except for one interesting interjection which contradicts the prevailing belief that Knox went up to Albany by boat. Preceding the comments about the attack into Canada, he says, "I shall set out by land tomorrow morning for Ticonderoga & proceed with the utmost expedition..." This couples with the rate of progress north each day and a subsequent letter to Captain Baylen regarding delay in returning the Captain's horse to emphasize the use of highway travel.

It also becomes clear in later correspondence that Knox first discussed the arrangements for strong sleds and draft animals with George Palmer in Stillwater on this trip north, although he made no mention of it in his diary at this time. In view of the later developments, it seems unfortunate that he was not able to meet Schuyler earlier instead of having to wait until Fort George where their meeting would be too brief.

In many of the accounts that have been printed about this journey, even when it is glossed over as a minor part of some longer record, an amusing anecdote is told of how Knox spent the whole evening of the 4th of December at Fort George in conversation with John Andre who had been captured at St. Johns and was on his way to Philadelphia to await a prisoner exchange. It makes a wistful tale when the ending stresses their common interest and yet how they would not meet again until Knox sat on the Courts Martial Board trying Andre as a spy in connection with the Arnold Affair. Unfortunately only a very few historians have come out and declared this to be an obvious fabrication with no foundation in truth. Knox tells in several places about seeing prisoners traveling south. He names some by name, and expresses pity for a few. But at no time in connection with the papers related to this expedition does he ever render a story of this sort, either mentioning Andre by name or telling of a similar incident regarding some other officer. We must relegate this to the category of a legend created by some of those romantics who always prefer fictional embellishments to fact. Instead it appears that Knox undertook to get a good night's rest and rise early before dawn on the 5th of December to meet and give two brief letters to Schuyler for transmittal to Cambridge before he crossed the lake to Ticonderoga.

It appears that Knox was aware of General Schuyler's impending return to Albany from Fort Ticonderoga, and that he expected to see him somewhere along the route. This he had had opportunity to learn during his brief stay at Albany on December 2nd, but whether this included anticipation of this meeting at Fort George is only a guess. However, the two letters he dashed off for Schuyler to dispatch to Cambridge help clarify Knox's immediate plans at this time.

"Fort George, Dec. 5, 1775

My Dear Lucy

I arrived here yesterday. I shall go this day over Lake George to Ticonderoga -- I have been exceedingly well since I left you -- I hope in God you keep up your spirits and are in perfect health I am now in the greatest hurry the battoes being waiting for me, having an opportunity to write to General Washington by General Schuyler I took this opportunity to write to the dearest object of my affections -- believe I think continually of you God preserve You

*I am your
Affectionate Husband
Henry Knox"*

"Fort George Dec 5, 1775

May It Please Your Excellency

I arrived here yesterday and immediately got ready to go over the lake this morning but General Schuyler arriving here before day prevents my going for an hour or two -- he had given me a list of those stores on the other side from which I am enabled to send Inventory of which I intend to forward to Camp -- the Garrison is to[o] weak at Ticonderoga the conveyance from the fort to the landing so indifferent and the passage across the lake so precarious that I am afraid it will be ten days at least before I can get them on this side of the lake -- when they are here the Conveyance from here will depend entirely on the sleding -- if that is good they shall immediately move forward -- without good sleding the roads are so much gullied it will be impossible to move a sled -- General Schuyler will do every thing possible to forward this business.

*I have the honor to be
with the greatest Respect
Your Excellency's most
Obedt Humble Servant
Henry Knox"*

This letter to Washington indicates that Knox was awakened by Schuyler's arrival, and certainly its wording suggests that he has received the latest data on weather conditions at Ticonderoga from the General as well as the list from which he could compile the inventory. However, it implies that Schuyler spent most of the night (or longer) traveling on the lake without explaining the urgency. The Washington Papers copy, quoted in NAVAL DOCUMENTS OF THE REVOLUTION in 1966, included the inventory of 49 guns, noting that six field carriages were being made in Albany, but all the rest would have to be made in Cambridge. Things were to change.

It is important to note at this point that Knox has a tendency to use careless forms of spelling when in a hurry, and when he encounters a name that is unfamiliar but which is not spelled out for him, he uses a phonetic spelling without indicating in any way his doubt about the correct form. In the above letter, he hastily substituted "to" for "too" -- a correction indicated by placing the second "o" in parentheses -- and the type of error he usually tried to avoid, perhaps even more meticulously than a better educated man might have done. At the same time we should note that his occasional slips and phonetic forms have led many researchers to draw unwarranted conclusions as to his exact meanings.

We should also note his clear references to the "indifferent" conveyance from the fort to the landing, and in turn his anxiety for snow after they would get back to Fort George with their cargo. His later stress on the need for snow has caused many historians to conclude that he needed and had ample snow at Ticonderoga. Knox himself does not indicate this. He does not report, either, that there

was or that there was not snow. It is quite justifiable to assume that his removal of the guns from the fort to the landing was neither aided nor impeded by this. At the same time, the data for the next ten days does indicate southerly winds which would give warmish days, and clear nights which would make good radiational cooling, to chill the lake waters to explain the scum ice form that had to be broken open one morning. None of this suggests significant snow.

We continue with the earlier transcription of the diary in lieu of the missing pages in the microfilm:

"5 We set sail from Fort George to go over the lake about 10 O'clock & having an exceeding fine passage reach'd the landing place belonging to Ticonderoga about half past five, and immediately went up to the Fort Ticonderoga, 3 miles, the length of the lake being 38 miles."

This entry has raised certain questions in the minds of researchers, and at the same time it gives clues for some answers. The first thought that comes to mind is the estimate of the length of the lake, especially as the level of the lake has been raised by a small flood control dam at the outlet since Knox's time. This would tend to increase the length slightly rather than shorten it. We can answer those who object because the official length of Lake George is now given as 32 miles by pointing out that the survey length and the navigational distance are two different things. In his outstanding book on the north country, ADIRONDACK ALBUM, Barney Fowler, the noted Albany Times-Union columnist, cites the fact that Diane Struble, when she swam the length of Lake George in 1958, had to swim a course that was 41 miles long. Her swim was lengthened by the need to avoid the colder center water, but even so, the shape of the lake and its islands prevent a straight line sail, and Knox's boatmen would have been accustomed to following the west shore as the normal lee shore, thus avoiding as much adverse wind as possible.

The second question has to do with the official landing place. The subsequent writings refer to the North Landing on the lake, and Knox has mentioned "the landing place belonging to Ticonderoga." There is a point of land on the east shore where an historic marker indicates that a blockhouse was built during the French and Indian War, that Roger's Rangers used that point, and that it was the outpost of the fort after it was captured by Amherst. However, this point is a considerable distance from the present north end of the lake, and Knox's reference to "Fort Ticonderoga, 3 miles," from the landing place implies a landing considerably nearer, somewhere on the river that drains the lake. This would make sense to anyone having to portage heavy supplies and anxious to shorten that overland tote as much as possible. Not knowing the exact conditions of the lake in 1775-1776, we are faced with a guess at best. Based on an old map of the town in that area, it seems reasonable enough to assume that the data given us by Knox

indicates a landing in the vicinity of the middle of the block between the intersection of Water Street and The Portage, and the Lower end of Water Street.

This seems to be a good place to interject one item which is not a direct part of the trek, but which occurred about this time and would concern Knox's future greatly. Knox departed from Cambridge a civilian. Congress had been given a request for a Colonelcy for him, properly endorsed and heavily sponsored by his friends such as John Adams, and we are told that they finally acted about a week after he left on this journey. We may assume that Washington considered the opportunity to bestow the rank in person as a suitable occasion for both rewarding a successful mission and creating the post of Commander of the Regiment of Artillery to go with the arrival of the guns. On the other hand, should the test indicate the inappropriateness of the appointment, that was the time to conclude the arrangement. Although others learned of the appointment in advance and began addressing Knox as "Colonel" even before he got back to Cambridge, Knox did not assume the title, and the following directive from the Knox Papers microfilms seems to illustrate the point.

"Headquarters 9th Dec. 1775


I am desired by His Excellency General Washington to request your immediate attendance at head Quarters in Cambridge

I am Sir
Your most Obedient
Humble Servant
Horatio Gates."

Clearly no one expected Knox to drop everything and rush back to Cambridge from Ticonderoga, but by setting forth the written directive when instructed to do so by Washington, Gates avoided the risk of forgetting to issue the summons in the excitement that was sure to prevail when the guns were delivered.



Remnants of Fort George in Lake George Battlefield Park



Knox trail marker in the Parade Ground inside Fort Ticonderoga. This marker differs from all others along the trail only by the statement "from this place" rather than "through this place passed".

V

THE COHORNS MOVE SOUTH

Having arrived at the fort on the evening of the 5th of December, Knox lost no time surveying the situation and getting things ready to move out. Some writers stress the fact that he inspected the guns and selected the best of what were largely stocks of worn out weapons. The fact that he began the move so promptly, and later reported that the armament was all removed from mounts and carriages, which would have to be fabricated at Cambridge, indicates that General Schuyler had anticipated him and, following his own instructions to be ready to ship what he could afford to lose from the defenses of the fort, ordered the guns to be readied. It is clear from what follows that Knox's main concern at this time was to get his cargo out of the fort, up to the North Landing, and onto the boats so that these could move south before ice blocked the lake.

We continue with the earlier transcription of his diary at this point:

- "6 Employ'd in getting the cannon from the fort on board a Gundaloe in order to get them to the bridge.
- 7 Employ'd in getting the cannon from the bridge to the landing at Lake George.
- 8 Ditto the mortars
- 9 Employ'd in loading the scow, Pettiaugre and a Battoe. At 3 OClock in the afternoon set sail to go down the lake in the Pettiaugre, the Scow coming after us run aground we being about a mile ahead with a fair wind to go down but unfair to help the Scow, the wind dying away we with the utmost difficulty reach'd Sabbath Day Point about 9 OClock in the evening -- went ashore & warm'd ourselves by an exceeding good fire in an hut made by some civil indians who were with their Ladies abed -- they gave us some Vension, roasted after their manner which was very relishing -- we warm'd [Probably a leaf torn out]"

At this point the microfilm of the diary in Knox's own writing is again available, and we will continue with that as the preferable prime source. However, certain points should be mentioned here. First, the early transcript cites the use of a "Pettiaugre", referring to a type of boat that was just becoming popular at the time. In the belief that the transcriber had trouble deciphering Knox's writing, and as other places refer to the same type slightly differently, the quotation here uses a closer and more probable translation of his scrawl. The Pettiaugre was a double-ended boat, based on a dug-out design, but most notable for a double mast rigging, the forward mast being canted forward while the aft mast was canted astern. Later in New York waters this design became commonly called a "perryauger", or some variation on the spelling of this word, and was in use as late as the 1930s. It is said that the configuration gave the effect of a gaff rigged jib sail, and was most valuable for maneuvering in closely confined spaces.

It is also important to note the reference to moving the guns by a gundaloe from the fort to the bridge. This has caused considerable dispute over the years as the landing where this would have been done is on the east side of the fort, and would involve a move of about a quarter mile in order to take the cargo around the point and about a half mile up the creek, while direct movement over the road which had been used regularly ever since 1755 would have been only a little further over land and would have avoided an extra loading-unloading operation. To add to the argument against this is the fact that Knox has an entry in his expenditure section to the effect that he paid twenty-six dollars to reimburse Captain Johnson

for paying the carters, and a receipt signed by Lieutenant Brown for the same things. These are as follows:

"Dec. 16 paid Lieut Brown for Capt. Johnson which repaid the carters for the use of their cattle in crossing the cannon from Ticonderoga to the north landing of Lake George 26 Dollars"

*"Fort George Dec 16 1775
Rec'd of Henry Knox Twenty Six Dollars which Capt. John Johnson paid to different Carters for the use of their Cattle in dragging Cannon from The fort of Ticonderoga to the North Landing of Lake George.
10.8 Wm Brown Jun Lieut."*

Added to this is a statement we will encounter later in William Knox's letter to Henry regarding the sinking of the scow. This indicates not only that the guns were hauled from the fort to the landing, but that the amount the Captain paid was less, and that William suspected a bit of hanky-panky by the Lieutenant.

Thirdly, although Knox does not mention the removal of the barrels from their mounts here, it is inferred later. Some writers have gone so far so to describe this as necessary in order to lower them over the parapets of the fort. Mr. John Auman, Manager of the Fort Ticonderoga Restoration advises that the logic of doing this rests in the deplorable condition the mounts were in after so many years of idle storage. On the other hand, there is no real reason apparent for having to lower the guns over the parapets. Forts are not built without any easy and logical means for installing or removing their armament. The only sensible comment regarding this -- and it applies as well to the question of whether the guns were hauled overland or moved to the bridge by boat -- is that Knox was in a hurry. He did whatever was easier and faster. If lowering any or all of the guns over the walls were faster, you can bet he did it -- if it were slower, FORGET IT! The chances are that Knox used both a water route and an overland route getting the guns up to Lake George. While they moved some of the heavier ones to the Gundaloe, the carts were probably hauling the other supplies such as flints and shot as well as some of the small guns up the road. Remember, to Knox time was all important. He was not only anxious to get his cargo to Cambridge, but he was in fear that a heavy spell of bad weather and a severe freeze at this moment would have him trapped at Ticonderoga until springtime.

The speed that Knox was achieving in getting the guns up to the lake seems to have been better than he anticipated. He would still require ten days to get them to Fort George, but this was more the result of adverse winds and bad navigation on the lake. The boats he used tended to be awkward unless they had a fair or following wind, and most of the time the wind was against them. This forced him to depend on the muscle power of oarsmen, and it was no easy task.

In picking up the diary entries, we now return to the writings in Knox's own hand. At the end of the last quotation from the earlier transcription we found a notation by that reporter that there seemed to be a page torn out. However, a careful reading over from that part into the next shows a broken chain of thought, but not the kind of date displacement that would accompany missing pages. It seems far more likely that Knox left an incomplete statement in mid-air when he came to the end of the page and did not consider it sufficiently important to complete it on the next sheet. His tendency to skip a word here or there in the daily account, quite different from his usual habit in letters, supports this conclusion. His words continue:

"We had been there when one of the Battoes which had set out nearly the same time Wednesday that we had, arrived by the view of the fire likewise came on there."

The reference to setting out "Wednesday" was one of the factors that confused the earlier reporter in his transcription. It appears fairly obvious that Knox delayed actual writing many times until he had time to sit down with facilities, and that this was what we would now call a typographical error -- in those days, would you call it a "slip of the pen?" Checking back on entries, we can see that he had gone north on Tuesday, December 5th. Wednesday was spent removing the cannon from the fort, and they departed from North Landing on Saturday. The next Wednesday would be December 13th, a day which his notes will show he consulted with George Palmer at Fort George. A better transcription of "Wednesday" might have been "and day".

"& the crew further informed us that the scow had run on a sunken rock but not in such a manner as to be irretrievable that they had broken all the ropes which they had in endeavoring to move her off -- but was ineffectual that they had sent up to the Fort for more ropes, & hands & intended in the morning to make another trial -- I doubted not but that they hoped [to] succeed -- the crew of the Bat-toe after having refresh'd themselves told me as they were not very deeply loaded that they intend'd to push for Fort George: Accordingly I jump'd into the Boat & ordered my man to bring my baggage & we would go with them -- accordingly we set out it being eleven O'clock with a light breeze ahead the men rowed briskly but we had not been out above an hour when the wind sprang up very fresh & directly against us -- the men after rowing exceedingly hard for about four hours seem'd desirous of going ashore to make a fire to warm themselves & I knowing them to be exceedingly weary -- they made an Excessive fire having only perhaps one or

two cords of wood at the time there being very large quantities of dry wood ready cut -- we warm'd ourselves sufficiently & took a comfortable nap -- laying with our backs to the fire -- about half an hour before day break that is about a quarter after rising we set out and in six hours & a quarter of excessive hard pushing against a fresh breeze we reach'd Fort George -- on Monday the 11th I sent an express to Squire Palmer of Stillwater to prepare a number of Sleds & oxen to drag the cannon & assume that we should get there & on Wednesday the 13th he came up & agreed to provide the necessary number of sleds & oxen & they to be ready by the first snow"

Although, and in fact because, the diary account runs along with hardly a break, it is wise to pause to consider some of the aspects of the journey just covered. The trip across the lake from the north to south has taken Knox the better part of two days. Going north was a good one day trip with a fair wind, but except for a brief period at the start of the return, they were bucking headwinds and currents. This limited the first day's progress to reaching Sabbath Day Point, six hours sailing time. The second lap carried them along for five hours until the boatmen were too tired, and they camped at an unidentified place where wood was stored ready to build a fire. They still had six and a quarter hours of hard rowing to reach Fort George. By an educated guess, it would seem that this stopping place was either at the tip of Tongue Mountain or on the point on the opposite shore now sometimes called Shelving Rock. There are some islands in this area which could have been used instead, but this is the part of the lake known as "the Narrows" where it would have been most logical for boats to cross to the eastern shore rather than swing west across the bay mouth by Tongue Mountain, and thus hold to the shortest route except when westerly winds might make the lee shore much more advantageous.

When Knox wrote that he sent an "express" to Stillwater, he was using a common term to designate a messenger dispatched to a specific designation and for no other purpose than that indicated. In the part where Knox itemized some of his expenditures, there is a notation that he gave Miller six dollars on the 11th of December to use in going to Stillwater, thus indicating his reliance on Miller for many of these duties. Without a doubt, whenever Knox refers to "my man", sending an "express", or to "we" when he tells about some of his own trips, he is mentioning the presence or his reliance on Miller.

There is one notable variance at this point. Knox has indicated in his diary that he sent the messenger on the 11th, yet the letter which was obviously carried is dated the 12th, and then he notes that Palmer came up to discuss the matter on the 13th. This demonstrates the tendency Knox has for writing a letter on one day, dating it the next because the messenger or post will be leaving

early on that day, and then referring in his notes to the day that he actually did write his message. In this instance, for example, it seems quite clear that he made the arrangements, gave Miller the money and instructions on the 11th, but as Miller would be leaving early in the morning of the 12th, he dated the letter then. It would also appear that Miller went to Stillwater, needed the money to pay for meals and lodging, and then returned with Palmer the next day.

Why Palmer should make the trip to Fort George when all Knox asked was for an answer to be returned by the messenger is not clear, although the contents of the letter does reveal the lack of regard Knox had for making proper financial arrangements. Quite clearly Schuyler did not approve of this, and later developments would show that, at least in this case, Knox had made a bad error. Possibly Knox was trusting in Palmer being a Mason and scrupulously concerned with honesty as a result, although no specific information about this has come to light. It is only an assumption based on general information about so many of the pioneers in the north country who had served in the French and Indian War and the fact that they had found the Indians often respected Masonic connections when nothing else would dissuade them from heathenish torture of their prisoners. In any event, the letter reveals much about Knox's trust in his fellow man and his immediate plans for moving the cannon.

"Fort George December 12, 1775

Capt. Palmer
Sir

In consequence of the intimation given to you by me sometime since that I should want your assistance I now write to you -- I must beg that you would purchase or get made immediately 40 good strong sleds that will each be able to carry a long cannon clear from dragging on the ground and which will weigh 5400 pounds each & likewise that you would procure oxen or horses as you shall judge most proper to drag them. you will also be the best judge of the number which will be wanting -- I think that you may be able to purchase sleds that are ready made which by strengthening might Do -- the sleds that they are first put upon are to go to camp near Boston -- the Cattle as far as Albany or Kinderhook where we must get fresh ones -- I most earnestly beg of you to spare no trouble or necessary expense in getting these things -- from the Character universally given to you & from your known attachment to the cause of your country I promise myself the completest assistance in your power -- whatever expense you are at I shall pay you immediately. I send you this by an express by whom I wish you to send me an answer directly

In the Interim I am
Sir Your Most Humble
Servant Henry Knox"

This was all but a blank check issued to a man who was virtually a stranger to Knox, and which called upon a rumored reputation for honesty plus a supposed patriotic fervor along with any unidentified fraternal loyalty to prevent him from overcharging. In time this would prove to be like setting the fox to guard the chicken house.

At about this same time, Knox prepared to leave the task of loading and dispatching the sleds in the hands of brother William. Several comments have been made about Knox's having made up several inventories, and that no two fully agreed. There were good explanations for such variances. The one in the diary is incomplete because of pages which have been lost, and it was only a loading list for each of the boats. However its total differed from the one dated December 10th by only one cannon, and it is this later list that seems to have been the basis for the follow-up inventory he sent to Washington on December 17th. The one dated the 10th is also the one which contained the loading instructions for William, and we offer it below as the most complete available. It is important to note that, had any guns on this list been lost or stolen as so many later rumors suggest, Knox would have had to make a full explanation to Washington when he arrived back at Cambridge. The fact that no such accounting was included in any of the papers, nor any mention made of a discussion of this nature, we can be reasonably assured that no loss of this sort took place on this journey. If any of the rumored "souvenirs" can be authenticated as having been part of Knox's caravan, it must be assumed that the loss took place later when the armament was being returned to Ticonderoga by freighters less meticulous than Knox.

Incidentally, it will be noted that the weights of the two Howitzers and the 24-pounder are given in terms unlike the others. By deduction, the Howitzers must have weighed 1100 pounds each.

In the following instructions, the amount of money has been spelled out. However, Knox tended to make notes in which his symbol for shillings and pounds were so similar that it would be easy for anyone to confuse meaning, even himself. When one gets through examining all the other discussions about the amount he paid or expected to spend for hauling, this entry seems far out of line, and with his mind on other matters, he may have erred by transcribing his own notations into pounds rather than shillings. It seems most certain that he meant to tell William that he expected to pay "seven shillings & Ten (pence) for every 62 miles or 12 (pence) per day..."

"By all means endeavor that the heavy Cannon and Mortars go off first. Let the touch holes & vents of all the mortars and cannon be turned downwards. The lead & flints are to come as far as Albany which will serve to make up a load. Observe that 2 pair of horses be to deliver two or three thousand weight & 3 or 4 oxen for the 4000 weights & 4 span for those of 5000 weight but Mr. Schuyler the D.I.G.

will see more particularly to this affair. The one span will take about 1000 weight they are to receive seven pounds & Ten for every 62 miles or 12 per day for each span of horses."


The Inventory left with Wm. Knox was as follows:

"MORTARS AND COHORNS					
	Dim. of bore	Ft & Ins of length	Weight	Total w/ht.	
Brass	2 Cohorns	5 7/10	1-1	150	300
	4 do	4 1/2	1-1	100	400
	1 mortar	8 1/2	2-0	300	300
	1 do	7 1/2	2-0	300	300
	8				
Iron	1 do	6 1/2	1-10	600	600
	1 do	10	3-6	1800	1800
	1 do	10 1/4	3-6	1800	1800
	2 do	13	3 [average]	2300	6900
	6				
Howitzers					
Iron	1	8	3-4	15.2.15	15.2.15
	1	8 1/4	3-4	15.2.15	15.2.15
	2	[16]			
Cannon					
Brass	8 3 pounders	3 1/2	3-6	350	2800
	3 6 do	3 7/10	4-6	600	1800
	1 18 do	5 1/2	8-3	2000	2000
	1 24 do	5 11/12	5-6	16.3.18	1800
Iron	6 6 do	3 7/10	9-7	2500	15000
	4 9 do	4 4/10	8-4	2500	10000
	10 12 do	4 3/4	9	2800	28000
	7 dbl fortif	5 1/2	9	4000	28000
	3 18 do	5 1/2	11	5000	15000
To. can	43				
Mortars	16				
	59				
			total weight		119,000

It is obvious that Knox was making careful plans to move his cargo as soon and as quickly as he could. He has made it clear that there was either no snow, or too insignificant an amount, at Lake George as late as the 13th of December. It now becomes clear that he is beginning to worry about the boats which have not yet arrived from Ticonderoga. His diary continues:

"on the 13th being very uneasy at not hearing of our little fleet we dispatch'd an Express boat -- about 2 O'clock but in the afternoon we Receiv'd advice that on the morning of the 10th the Scow had gotten off the rock on which she had run & with great difficulty had reach'd Sabbath Day Point -- & on the same night the wind being exceeding high the sea had beat in her in such a manner that she had sunk -- this news was ..."

At this point several pages have been torn out of the diary, even before the earlier transcription was made. However, we can get an even better picture of what had happened from the letter William Knox wrote to Henry on the 14th. In reading this, it should be noted that William frequently wrote "off" as "of" and we have indicated the correction by enclosing the second "f" in parentheses. The microfilm carried the notation that William was 19 years and 3 months old at this time. It also appears that Knox's diary notation of the 13th based on information received from the crew of another boat which arrived shortly after the dispatch of his "Express boat" rather than by the return of the messenger with William's letter.



View of Sabbath Day Point from overlook area on Route 9N.

"North Landing Dec 14th 1775
at Sabbath Day Point

Dear Brother

Last evening the boat arrived which you sent with the letters and provisions we got of[f] the scow Sabbath day morning and immediately set of[f] for Sabbath Day Point where we arrived in the evening beating all the way against the wind. Monday morning our scow sunk but luckily so near the shore that when she sank her gunnel was above water so that shortly we were able to bail her out and tow her to the leeward shore of the point where we took out the three mortars and by shifting the cannon aft bottomed her and now she stands ready for sail the first fair wind -- Capt. Johnson arrived at Sabbath Day Point about the time your boat did and this morning I set out with him in your boat for the landing when we arrived we sent of[f] the new petiaugre with the 2 - 18 pounders and with 4 - 12 pounders as far as she could get for the ice for it is frozen a mile which they will have to cut through -- but I expect she will be at Lake George by the time the scow does I intend coming in her because I think it necessary that one of us should see that they do their duty faithfully -- Capt. Johnson paid 20 dollars for carting which if you have an opportunity to send him before the Lieut. arrive you had better God send us a fair wind

Yours

*affectionately
W. Knox"*

A few writers have blamed William for the sinking of the scow, claiming that it was his inexperience that was the cause. From the preceding accounts, both what Henry saw on the lake, what was reported to him by the first boat to catch up with him at Sabbath Day Point, and in this letter, nothing seems further from the truth. Moreover, he has expressed doubts about the diligence of the men they were working with, at least as far as the boating is concerned, and his suggestion that Henry send the Captain his \$20 before the Lieutenant could come to collect it couples with the later receipt to show that he had ample basis for doubting the reliability of some of the troops. "Cost over-runs" and illicit claims are not something peculiar to the twentieth century!

Henry Knox's record of expenses shows that he paid off the boatmen on the 15th of December. This makes it appear that all the guns had arrived at the south end of Lake George by this time -- perhaps William's prayer for a fair wind was speedily answered by the same turn in weather which brought ice to the lake. In any event, by Saturday night or Sunday -- noting Knox's tendency to write his letters the night before they were dated and carried out -- the task was accomplished and he wrote several letters dated

December 17th (Sunday) in which he indicated that this has been done safely in spite of his troubles. He also took stock of the situation and found it convenient to initiate a request for mortar ammunition which he had not anticipated needing earlier.

Up to this point, there has been no specific reference to the weather -- whether it had been sunny or cloudy, snow or bare ground. Knowing local seasonal tendencies and the winds he has reported, as well as his not mentioning any especially cold spell as he does later, we can make certain educated guesses. The wind having been out of the south, it is reasonable to believe that the general temperature was warmer than normal, while the freezing of the lake with the first sign of a fair wind implies that the skies were fairly clear, at least at night to facilitate radiational cooling of the water. This leads one to suspect that the days were warmish and clear, and that there was little or no snow. His subsequent complaints about the lack of snow further support this assumption. His failure to complain about the cold, although he mentions warming by a fire on several occasions, leads one to believe that it is the radiational cooling and a wind chill from the southerly breeze rather than cold, northern winds that the boatmen felt and which prepared the lake waters for a quick freeze when a cold front finally arrived.

The following letters dated December 17th help fill the gap in the diary, verifying past data and preparing us for what comes later.

"Fort George Dec 17, 1775

To Col. McDougal

Sir

When I was at New York I did not know of any 13 Inch Mortar among munitions of which I found at Ticonderoga -- I must beg you Sir that you would use your influence that there is sent immediately to Camp at Cambridge the following numbers of shells. You are too well acquainted with the importance of this Equipt to want the [urging?] an additional motive for the utmost expedition

The Business upon which I came up here has succeeded very well

I am Sir with great
Respect your Obedient
and Most Humble Servent
Henry Knox

500 13 Inch Shell
200 5¾ " "
400 4½ " "

[McDougal's endorsement:]
If these are not to be had plan
to inform Genl Washington
Immediately
Col McDougal NYork"

[Note indicates this to Gen. Schuyler]

"Fort George Dec 17, 1775

Sir

We have been so fortunate as to get the mortars and cannon safely over the Lake to this place -- I arrngd with Capt. Palmer of Stillwater to get proper conveyances for them from here to [Springfield ?] -- we are apprehensive of a difficulty necessary [carrying ?] over at Albany for want of a proper scow I am not well enough acquainted with the road after we cross at the half moon to know whether it be practicable to keep on the east side of the river entirely to Kinderhook -- I expect Capt. Palmer up with the teams on Tuesday or Wednesday and I expect on [Thursday ?] to move as far as Saratoga if the sledding continues as at present -- from thence we must wait for snow -- I had heard Sir that you were gone to Philadelphia in consequence of which I wrote to Mr. Livingston at Albany for 500 fathoms 3 inch rope to fasten the Cannon on the sleds -- It has not yet arrived.

I beg Sir that you will Please to give an order for its being forwarded with the utmost expedition and also Sir I take the liberty of requesting the favor of you to forward the enclosed letters by the most speedy conveyance.

I am with the
Utmost Respect
Your Most Obedient
Humble Servant"

[no signature]

This letter to Schuyler clearly establishes certain facts which have been disputed or the subject of misunderstanding by several subsequent historical researchers. First, when Knox referred to the "half moon" or "Half Moon crossing" he was talking about the Hudson River. Because present day Half Moon Village is closer to the Mohawk River and the site of the Loudon Ferry which was used later in the Revolution when the fords at the mouth of the Mohawk were impassable because of heavy rains or spring thaws causing the Mohawk to reach flood stage, these writers have insisted that he never did cross the Hudson at this point, and that his alternative was to cross the Mohawk only at Loudon Ferry. Such historians have destroyed their own work by their adamant insistence that Knox did not know what he was writing about in his own journal. He repeats his data in other writings, but at this time we see his doubts about the Hudson being frozen at Albany to carry his guns, and the need for a scow unlike any he had seen there earlier.

This letter also establishes that enough snow has fallen at Lake George for Knox to plan to move his sleds at this time. His earlier comments thus indicate to us that the passage of the cold front, which we suspected was the change in weather that brought ice to

the lake, was also the condition that made sledding possible. Certainly on the 13th when Palmer came to consult, his reported promise to have sleds ready for the first snow indicated that there had been none up to then, and it was the 14th when William wrote to indicate that the first troublesome ice had appeared. The fact that Knox now says the sleds will only move as far as Saratoga (now Schuylerville) unless there is more snow implies that he has received a message from Palmer to this effect, probably at the same time that he advised that the teams would be brought up about Tuesday or Wednesday, the 19th or 20th of December.

Knox also wrote the following report to Washington which also sets forth his planned route and the fact that the guns will need to have mounts prepared at Cambridge to replace those removed at Ticonderoga. There is an interesting section in which he discusses the conditions in Canada and which could justify an extensive commentary in itself, but this would be immaterial to the subject of this account of his own expedition.

"Fort George Dec. 17, 1775

May it please your Excellency

I returned to this place and brought with me the Cannon. It being nearly the time I conjectured it would take us to transport them to here. It is not easy [to] conceive the difficulties we have had getting them over the Lake owing to the advanced Season of the years and contrary winds, but the danger is now past & three days ago it was very uncertain whether we could have gotten them until next spring, but now Please God they must go -- I have had made forty two exceedingly strong sleds & have provided eighty yoke of oxen to drag them as far as Springfield where I shall get fresh cattle to carry them to camp -- the rout[e] will be from here to Kinderhook from thence into Great Barrington Massachusetts Bay & down to Springfield. There will scarcely be any possibility of carrying them from here to Albany or Kinderhook but on sleds the roads being very much gullied -- at present the sledding is tolerable to Saratoga about 26 miles; beyond that there is none -- I have sent for sleds & teams to come here & expect to begin [to] move them to Saratoga on Wednesday or Thursday next trusting that between this & then we shall have a fine fall of snow which will enable us to proceed further & make the carriage easy -- If that should be the case I hope in 16 or 17 days time to be able to present your Excellency a noble train of artillery the inventory of which I have Inclosed. I also send a list of those stores which I desired Col McDougal to send from New York -- I did not know then of any 13 Inch mortars which was the reason of my ordering but few shells of that size. I now wrote to him

for 500 13 Inch -- & also 200 5¼ & 400 of 4½ Inches for the Cannon if these sizes would be had there as I think they can I should imagine it would save time & expense [to] get them from thence rather than cast them -- if Sir you think otherwise or have made provision for them elsewhere you will please to countermand this order -- there is no other news of Col. Arnold than that from Col McClean, having burnt the houses round Quebec Col Arnold was oblig'd to go to Point Au Tremble about 6 miles from the city -- that General Montgomery had gone to join him with a considerably Body of men & a good train of artillery -- there are some timid & some malevolent spirits [which] [wish?] to make this matter worse -- but by the different accounts which I have been able to collect I have very little doubt that General Montgomery has Quebec in his possession.

I am with the utmost
respect Your Excellency's Most
Obed't Hmble Servant

PS You will please to observe that there are no carriages nor Implements to the Cannon nor beds to the Mortars, all of which must be made in Camp."

In the foregoing letters, it has been necessary to make certain corrections and insertions. In those instances where the original words were difficult to decipher and an estimate made as to the actual word, the supposed word has been placed in parentheses with a question mark, although other data tends to support the choice offered. In a few places a letter or extra word not in the original seems appropriate to clarify or correct the spelling or grammar, and in the belief that the omission was an oversight, the correction has been inserted in parentheses without a question mark.

Henry also took this opportunity to write again to his wife. Although this letter does not add much to what we already have, many will find it an interesting insight into the man as well as a minor support to the data already covered. His reference to a friend named "Harry" is to an old friend, Harry Jackson, who has indicated that he expected to hear from Knox on some other personal matters.

"Fort George Dec 17, 1775

My dearest Companion

It is now twelve days since I've had the least opportunity of writing to her who I value more than life itself. How does my Charmer? is she in health & spirits? I trust in God she is -- My last letter mentioned that I was just going over Lake George about 36 miles in length -- We had a tedious time of it altho the passage was fine -- in coming back it

was exceedingly disagreeable -- but all danger and the principal difficulty is now past & by next Thursday I hope we shall be able to set out from hence on our journey home -- with our very valuable & precious convoy -- if we have the good fortune to have snow I hope to have the pleasure to see my dearest in three weeks from this date -- don't grieve my dear at its length I wish to heaven it was [in my?] power to shorten the time -- a time already elaps'd far beyond the bearing of an eager Expectation to see you -- We shall cut no small figure In going thro the Country with our Cannon Mortars &c -- drawn by eighty yoke oxen -- I have not had an unwell hour since I left you. My brother Wm is also exceedingly well & has been the utmost service to me -- I most fervently wish that my dear dear Lucy might have been equally happy with respect to her health -- had I the power to transport myself to you -- how eagerly rapid would be my flight -- It makes me smile to think how I should look -- like a tennis ball bowl'd down the [steep ?] -- Give my love to my friend Harry I certainly should have written to him before but every minute of my time is taken up in forwarding the important business I'm upon -- My compliments to Mr. Pelham & family -- I have had the pleasure of seeing a considerable number of our enemies prisoners to the Bravery of America -- Enemies who would not before this allow the Americans a spark of military virtue -- their note is now changed -- some are to be much pitied -- others are not so much -- all in a degree in their [infatuation ?] is surprising -- but I [trust ?] will have its end -- May he who holds the hearts of all flesh in his hands incline America to put their sole confidence in him & then he will still continue to be their Leader & May he condescend to take particular care & give Special directions to your Guardian Angell Conserving you

Adieu My only love
for the present adieu
HKnox

I inclose this in the General Dispatches"



Lake George in Winter about as it would have been with the amount of snow indicated by Henry Knox on December 17, 1775.

VI

TROUBLE BREWS

On the 17th of December Knox thought that the worst of his journey was over -- he had crossed the lake before it froze over, and all he needed was a good cover of snow to make the trip to Cambridge an easy slide home. He was much mistaken. The worst was immediately ahead.

The first hint of trouble appears in a letter penned by General Schuyler immediately upon receiving Knox's note of the 17th. It would seem that this was the first knowledge the General had of Palmer's employment, and he was not at all pleased. Although he gives some reasons for objecting to the arrangements, we must presume that there is more to his aversion than meets the eye. Probably he was well aware of the type of man Knox had dealt with and knew that greed was greater than any go-go patriotism.

"Albany Dec. 18th 1775

Sir

I am happy to hear that all the military stores you had in charge to bring from Fort Ticonderoga are arrived at Fort George. I have taken measures to forward them to Boston as soon as we shall be favoured with a fall of snows. But I am informed that you have applied to Mr. Palmer to Construct Carriages for the purpose. This is very unnecessary & [Expensive?] as there are a sufficiency of carriages available for the purpose in this country sufficient to carry ten times the quantity you will therefore Countermand any directions you may have given Mr. Palmer in this [Lead?]

I am Sir

Your Humble Servant
Ph. Schuyler"

There is no document in the microfilms to show what Knox did in response to this command, but it is quite clear that something was done. Either he communicated with Palmer indicating that he felt compelled to follow the explicit instructions of any such high ranking officer and thus had to cancel his earlier liberal agreement, or Schuyler himself took the initiative to send a directive to Palmer to desist from any further expensive construction and contracting before matters could get too far out of hand. In either event, a week later on Christmas Palmer sent off the following letter, addressed on the wrapper to "Col. Henry Knox, Esq. of the Train of Artillery at Albany or elsewhere."

"1775

Dr. Sir

Since Your Departure from here I have an opportunity with Many of the inhabitants with whom I have Contracted for the Removal of the Artillery and Stores I find All Determined To A Man to fulfill on their Part & that I shall on mine or Be Answerable for the Consequences of A Disappointment which is More than I Shall Be Able to Do. Depend Sir the People [&Not only those employed in Service but others General] are Not indifferent, they are sensible of the importance of the Grand Cause they are Sensible to the Minutest Degree of the insult offered in counteracting your Measures. I take this Earliest opportunity to inform you of the Disposition of the People Among whom I Live with whom I am concerned Particularly in this affair Your Penetration will Easily Discern the Consequences that will follow Disappointing Such A Number of People So Resolutely Determined as you may Depend & hope are, with Regard to what you mentioned at our Carrying the heavy pieces

they are Determined Since there is such an attempt made to supplant them to fulfill the whole contract I am sir with all possible Respect your most obedient humble servant.

Stillwater 25th Dec. 1775 George Palmer"

In the wrapper address, Palmer has used Knox's rank, indicating that word is out as to the existence of the commission, although Knox himself has not resorted to the title, and by addressing him at "Albany or elsewhere", he implies a realization that Knox is on the move.

Later we shall see that, when we can again pick up the sequence in Knox's diary, he was passing through Stillwater on this same day. Although Knox does not record any visit with Palmer at this time, it might have been as he passed by that he told Palmer to hold off, although this does not seem a likely explanation. If he did, Palmer did not take very long to talk with his sub-contractors in spite of the snowy conditions before he sent off his veiled threat. Palmer was probably worked up over Schuyler having made a direct intervention, and Knox was avoiding any extended meeting before he saw Schuyler in person himself.

There is a companion account of the expedition based on the recollections of a man named John P Becker as given in a newspaper interview about 60 years later. Becker was a boy of 12 at the time, and went along with his father who was one of the drovers who went from Fort George to Springfield. The Beckers were residents of Saratoga (Schuylerville) at the time, which tends to indicate a potential connection with Palmer. This is supported further by the fact that Becker commented in his account about the extra strong sleds Knox had ordered to be made for the task. If this is so, the fact that Becker went along after the termination of Palmer's contract was made final, indicates that individuals were quite willing to accept the pay that Schuyler offered, and that the better part of the difference was going into Palmer's pocket.

Although the letter implies that Palmer blamed Schuyler for the disruption of the agreement, he was not above making thinly disguised threats against the convoy -- threats that all too easily could have come true. According to Paul Rayno, Historian for the Town of Kingsbury, the divided feelings of the colonists were marked in the upper Hudson Valley by strong pockets of Tory sentiment in the vicinity of present day Hudson Falls and Fort Edward. Such centers must have had adherents in most of the communities along the river in that region, just as some of those who were such violent Loyalists also found close blood relatives were of quite opposing views as Whig Patriots. In full fairness to all, however, we should note the following letter addressed to Knox by Walter Livingston. We do not know the name of the man to whom he referred -- it could have been Becker, for at a later point Becker gave a detailed account of his father's part in the accident at Lansing's Ferry and the employment of horses there.

Incidentally, it is interesting to note that Livingston also sent his letter to "Col. Knox".

"Dec 18, 1775

Sir:

The bearer can procure four pair of horses to carry one of the longest cannon but would rather go with two sleighs and two pair of horses to each I believe there will be a sufficient number engaged by evening to carry the lightest Cannon If you can persuade him to go with four horses he will take an order for one of the longest.

*Your Humble Servant
Walter Livingston"*

By the date of the letter, it is clear that the man Livingston had recruited became involved before Palmer was fired, and this would explain both his taking along his son as an assistant and the recollection of the construction of the extra strong sleds, as well as any related dissociation from the effects of Palmer's dismissal. However, there is still another possible name to connect to this unknown driver. Near the back of the diary, Knox recorded one name with absolutely no clue as to why he entered it -- that name was entered simply as, "Daniel Clute of Schenectady." There was a Daniel Toll Clute who was later listed as a member of the Schenectady Militia, and whose age might have made him a possible drover in this expedition. He might have been Livingston's "bearer", or he might have been one of those later recruited by General Schuyler's Waggonmaster. Yet again, he may have been merely a man Knox met, possibly in a Masonic Lodge meeting, whose name he wished to remember for personal reasons. At this time the relationship between Knox and Clute remains an unexplained mystery.

The diary picks up again after the lapse of one or more pages, the torn edges of which partially obscure some of the lines on the next page. This represents a gap of about 10 days, and a notation by a later scholar indicates that he believed this to recommence on the 26th of December. Back-tracking from a later entry shows that it actually picks up during Knox's advance run from Fort George to Albany on December 24th, Christmas Eve. The filled-in or missing letter and words are indicated by parentheses.

"[o]n foot about 6 miles in []er midst of an exceeding fine []snow--where Judge Dewer procur'd me a sleigh to go [] to Stillwater"

One of the missing words clearly ended in "er", but what it could have been is anyone's guess. It had no more than 3 or 4 letters missing. The reference to Judge Dewer is to a man well recorded in local history as having lived at or near the present village of Fort Miller. According to Paul Rayno, the name is usually given as "Duer", and that he served as a magistrate in the absence of Philip Schuyler when the General was ill. Among his associates

was one Pat Smyth of Fort Edward who, along with Gil Harris of Hudson Falls, incited violent Tory activity during the later days of the Revolution. Harris had a nephew, Moses Harris, living in the Queensbury community which later became known as Glens Falls, who was just as determined a Whig Patriot as his uncle was a Loyalist. Once again, this reveals the sharp divisions between friends, neighbors, and even families that this war produced. It is impossible to guess whether Judge Duer even expressed opinions at the time that Knox was at his place. Knox only mentions his kindness at obtaining a sleigh to help him, and we may feel some confidence in expressing the opinion that Duer was assisting a brother Mason regardless of any political sympathy or disagreement that he might have held at the time.

"- after crossing the [] ferry we got with Considerable difficulty to Arch McNeals Saratoga [w]here we dined & set off about [th]ree OClock it still snowing [exc]eeding fast & it being very [] - after the utmost efforts [] horses we reach'd Ensign's [taver]n 8 miles beyond Saratoga - we lodg'd"

The insertions made above seem quite reasonable on the basis of either the available letters and the relative space blocked out, and from information such as a map which identified Ensign's Tavern by name. In those instances where there was nothing to suggest a word, a plain blank space is indicated, although the earlier transcriber took the liberty of guessing completely at words he thought might fit. It seems preferable to leave it entirely up to some future scholar to conduct his own review without imposing too much of a preconception.

In THE HISTORY OF WATERFORD, NEW YORK, Hammersley comments that the early roads, even after the turn of the century, were so bad that travelers had to pause every mile or so to rest, and that taverns, inns, and other such resting places were almost within sight of each other, yet doing a thriving business. Prior to the construction of actual hostleries, almost every farmer along the highway offered shelter, food and refreshments for which they received much of the little cash money that they had for their transactions. Arch McNeal's seems to have been one of the first of the regular inns, and Ensign's was early marked on the maps as a tavern although it was later known as a farm and was the site of one of the now missing Knox Trail plaques until it burned shortly after the middle of the twentieth century. Stories are told locally by those who remember that and another house, also now gone, that stood on the same property, about the wide floor boards which, after the buildings were used as a British hospital during the Battle of Saratoga, had to be turned over because of the blood which had penetrated too deep to be washed or sanded away.

"- In the [mor]ning the snow being [] two feet deep we with []drenable reach'd about []miles we then procur'd [] & went to Stillwater [] we got

a sleigh to go to [Al]bany but the roads not being broken prevented our getting farther than New City about 9 miles above Albany -- where we lodg'd."

Probably the most significant point here is the fact that Knox went through Stillwater and even obtained a sleigh there, but never once made mention of George Palmer. If their relationship had not been strained, one could expect to read that Knox saw him, and possibly had gotten the sleigh from him. This further strengthens the suspicion that Knox was avoiding any meeting until he could at least talk with Schuyler.

Knox next makes the point that they stopped at New City, 9 miles from Albany. French's Gazetteer identifies this as Lansingburg, and Hammersley carries it further to point out that this is not only now a part of North Troy, but was on occasion in the early time known by its Dutch spelling and sometimes was even called New York City -- tortunately this latter appellation has not appeared often enough to cause any major confusion with the better known metropolis on Manhattan Island. An old map drawn to scale does show that the group of houses which made up Lansingburg was just about 9 miles north of Albany. Hammersley also informs us that the customary route in the 1770s was to cross at Lansing's Ferry by the old Half Moon Fort, travel south through New City and what became Troy but was often called Stone Arabia in those times -- another potential confusion with the Stone Arabia where Fort Paris stood to help guard the Mohawk Valley near Fort Plain -- and then back across the Hudson at Schuyler Flatts, and on down to Albany. The reason given for this crossing at Half Moon Fort, Menands, and again at Albany for those wishing to go east was said to be to avoid having to cross the four mouths of the Mohawk, although during the Revolution this became the preferred route in all but those times when the Mohawk was flooded by heavy rains or spring thaw. No one ever makes specific comment as to why the road from Troy to the Village of Greenbush (now Rensselaer) as shown in Sauthier's map was avoided, although we can suppose from Knox's early doubts that it was a road in name only.

"In the morning we set out & only got about 2 miles when our horses tir'd and refus'd to go any farther -- I was then Oblig'd to undertake a very fatiguing march of about 4 miles in Snow three feet deep thro' the woods there being no beaten path -- I got to Squire Fishers who politely gave me a fine breakfast & provided me with horses which crossed me as far as Col. Schuylers where I got a sleigh to carry me to Albany where I reach'd about [two ?] I had almost perish'd with the cold. In the afternoon waited on Gen'l Schuyler & Spent the evening with him

27 Sent off for Mr. Palmer to come immediately down to Albany.

28th Mr. Palmer Came Down & after a considerable degree of conversation between him & General Schuyler about the price the General Offering 18/9 & Palmer asking 24 S a day for 2 Yoke of oxen the treating broke off abruptly & Mr. Palmer was dismiss'd by reports from all party price is too steep for the cannon to [start even ?] if the sleds were ready.

29th General Schuyler agreed with sent out his Waggon Master & other people to all parts of the country to immediately send up their slays with horses suitable [thence?] allowing them 12 sh per day for each pair of horses & oxen per Ton for 62 miles

The 31st the Waggen master Return'd the names of persons in the different parts of the Country who had gone up to the Lake with their horses in the whole amounting to near 124 pair -- with Slays which I'm afraid are not strong enough for the heavy Cannon If I can judge from the sample shown me by Gen'l Schuyler.

January 1st to 4th employ'd in getting holes cut in the different crossing places in the river in order to strengthen the Ice."

Knox has now revealed several points for our consideration. His run south from Fort George has been slower than anticipated, plagued by a steady snow and very cold weather, yet this has been just what he wanted for good ice on the river crossings and to move the sleds with their heavy loads. On the other hand, few if any sleds have been loaded, Palmer has failed to keep his promise of sleds ready for the first snow, and now he has held out for an impossibly high fee that has caused his final discharge by General Schuyler. That the rate was totally unreasonable is well established by the fact that men with sleds and teams have responded at a price even less than the best Schuyler would offer Palmer. Knox has seen a sample of the sleds being brought in, and has expressed fear that these are too weak for the task, but whether this is an honest criticism or merely his own ego speaking, we cannot be sure. Becker's account later spoke of breakdowns due to the bad roads and the heavy loads that the sleds could not take, so perhaps there was some justification for Knox's doubts. On the other hand, Knox has had to admit that he was unwise in his dealing with Palmer, and is lucky to have been rescued from that situation by the older, firmer Schuyler.

By the first of the new year, sleds and teams were arriving at Fort George for William Knox to start loading and dispatching. There is no indication that the sleds were held at the fort to be dispatched as a unit or in sections. Becker only reported going from Fort George to Glens Falls (or the old village near Fort Amherst in Queensbury which became Glens Falls later) in the first day's run --

a distance short enough to represent only a part of a day of actual travel. There seems to be a clear indication that each sled left as soon as it was loaded, and the train was spread out along the road accordingly until weak ice at river crossings and breakdowns forced groups to gather and eventually stay together for mutual aid.

This delay has caused an additional problem. The bitter cold which plagued Knox on his own run, and which made good ice right after Christmas, has dissipated, and now he has men out cutting holes in the ice to bring up fresh water in an effort to make thicker, stronger ice able to carry the loads. Knox has been fairly clear, and will be more so in subsequent statements, that he has been referring to the Hudson River. His own advance run checked these crossings and, although he admits to four such places, he shows that he does not really enjoy the prospect. Many writers have questioned whether Knox ever did make or planned to make four crossings. Hammersley acknowledges that Knox did do this in his own run, but arbitrarily denies that any guns ever followed that route. The following diary entry and the letters dated January 5th should set the record straight -- the first guns across at Lansing's Ferry included the big 24 pounder, and the one that went through the ice there was one of the later, heavy iron pieces.

"Thursday the 4th arriv'd a brass 24 pounder & a small mortar. I this day sent a letter to Gen'l Washington one to Gen'l Gates also one to Capt. Baylen and one to my lovely Lucy."

To General Washington

"Albany Jan 5, 1776

Sir

I did myself the honor to address your Excellency from Fort George on the 17th. I then was in hopes that we should have been able to have had the cannon at Cambridge by this time. The want of snow detain'd us some days & now a cruel thaw hinders from crossing Hudson River which we are oblig'd to do four times from Lake George to this Town -- the first severe night will make the ice on the river sufficiently strong 'til that happens the Cannon & mortars must remain where they are -- most of them at the different crossing places & some few here -- the inevitable delays pain me exceedingly as my mind is fully sensible to the importance of the greatest expedition in the Case -- In eight or nine days after the first severe freeze they will be at Springfield from which place we can get them easily transported altho' there should be no snow -- but to that City roads are so excessively bad snow will be necessary -- We got over 4 more [of the satisfied?] 18 pounders after my last to your excellency -- I send a duplicate of the

list for fear of miscarriage of the prior. General Schuyler has been exceedingly assiduous in this matter. As to myself my utmost endeavors have been & still shall be [used?] to forward them with the utmost dispatch


*I have the honor to be
with the greatest Respect
Your Excellency's Most
Ob'dt & Hble Serv.
HKnox"*

Knox's statements cannot be ignored. He has checked his route. He has had guns go over it, including some of the heaviest. He has not relished the risks that he foresaw, but has faced them as unavoidable. His only serious planning error, other than misjudging Palmer, has been to neglect that standard of military philosophy which says, "If anything can go wrong -- IT WILL". When some writers doubt that he crossed the Hudson, and fail to observe the difference between old Fort Half Moon and the modern Half Moon Village to insist that he planned to cross the Mohawk, they have skimmed the surface and neglected all of his statements, discounting what they do not choose to accept simply because it can be demonstrated that he did have to change his plans from time to time. A careful reading, as in this case, shows that his statements as to both plans and deeds are correct. When he has had to change plans, he says so, and the timing of the change will reveal much to clarify the points which have so often been argued by various factions.

Knox sent two final inventories to Washington, and those who point to "souvenirs" left along the route, or claim that certain guns were never recovered when they fell in the Mohawk -- or not until much later -- fail to realize that Knox was facing a test. Having sent these two inventories, he had to deliver or offer a darn good reason why a piece should be missing. As there is no document in the microfilms and no report or mention in his diary about this, we are fully justified to believe that every gun listed was delivered at Cambridge. Even Becker gives us a good idea of how the 18 pounder that went through the ice at Lansing's Ferry was recovered, and there was no report in either his or Knox's writings of any lost in the Mohawk. This is not to say that such souvenirs or later recoveries are not legitimate, but that they must have been lost from the train that returned guns to Ticonderoga after the British evacuated Boston. We do not know who was in charge of that expedition, but the total lack of information alone implies it was handled by someone with far less concern for a successful delivery than Knox has shown.

We should note that Knox did not anticipate any trouble in moving his cargo from Springfield to Cambridge. All his problems as he saw them involved the poor roads in the relatively new territories in the north country and over the mountains west of the Connecticut River. Knox was not alone in his failure to consider the

trip from Springfield to Boston worthy of detailed reporting or recording. In trying to locate maps of the roads east of the Connecticut River, one continually finds either the cartographers or the historians who record such information about the Berkshires and Green Mountains commenting on there being no need to do this further east -- a typical "Everyone knows" attitude that ignores the potential ravages of change in the future.



Half Way Brook marker near Glens Falls City line on Route 9. Site of small Fort Amherst.

INTERLUDE AND REVIEW

Knox wrote two other letters from Albany on the 5th of January which are available in his papers on microfilm. We do not have the one mentioned as being sent to General Gates, but it seems a fair presumption that this was very similar to the one to Washington, covering some more technical details perhaps, but adding little to the understanding we have of his journey. The letter to Captain Baylen is brief, and its only significance is to reemphasize the point which has been so often contradicted by those who have not read far enough to realize that the journey from New York to Albany was over land rather than by river boat.

"Albany Jany 5, 1776

Dear Sir

I wrote to you from New York apologizing for taking your horse which my brother had in charge -- I think the leaving him on the road would be hazardous -- his getting to you uncertain & his keeping Expensive -- I have left him since I first Came to this Town where has not been rode any & has been well [keepen ?] -- had I thought I should have been Oblig'd to Stay so long I believe I should not have taken him -- but I must appeal to Your Good nature as an excuse.

I am Dear Sir
Your Most Oblig'd
Hble Srvt
Henry Knox"

Knox's letter to his wife on this date reemphasizes the belief that he often wrote his letters on the day before the date that he placed on them. In this case we see both his closing reference to the late hour -- actually the very early time of the date given -- and he fails to mention anything about his visit to Cohoes Falls about which he writes so ecstatically in his diary, yet he goes into so much detail about other places which have impressed him less.

This letter is one of the longest Knox wrote. More than half has no bearing on the expedition, but it is quoted in full because of the insight it gives to his character and relations with his wife as well as his impressions of the places he has visited.

"Albany Jan 5, 1776

My Lovely & Dearest Friend

Those people who love as you & I do never ought to part. It is with the greatest anxiety that I am forc'd to date my letter at this distance from my love at a time when I thought to have been happily in [back home ?] -- I feel for you my Lucy I feel for myself but

as the seeing her without whom life is a blank must in the course of events be protracted for a week or two longer I am resolved to write her a long letter -- a man whom General Washington has sent express to General Schuyler has promis'd me to deliver it with his own hands to you -- for which you will give something with what rapture should I receive a letter from my angels hands I should think it one of the best boons of heaven -- I would kiss & would just [i——?] my bosom & wear it there 'til no part remained. Yet though it would be the last token of her love, it would not be the shortest in my mem'ry My Lucy is perpetually in my mind Constantly in my heart. I wish my Interest was as sure in heaven as I am it is in my Lucy I would pray without ceasing for her happiness. May that Being who blesses the universe with the ray of his benign Providence bless you with a happy new Year and give You every joy & every wish necessary to your felicity -- I am exceeding concern'd for fear my love should repine at my not being able to come at the time expected do not I beseech you -- consider & keep in mind the happy day and happy meeting we shall have after two months of very strained Absence, if my Dear thinks of it with [the as being ?] expectation I do as I believe she does it will go a great way in soothing the present in expectation of the future -- I don't know what kind of reasoning this is but I know it certainly is so altho' I've not clearly expressed it -- This is only the fourth letter that I have had an opportunity to write to you, one of them a very little sneaking one indeed which was owing to its being written before day in the most rushing hurry as General Schuyler had just then arriv'd from Ticonderoga over Lake George and was going to set out immediately for Albany -- often since when I reflected upon its shortness I would almost wish I had sent none -- In my last I informed you which was Dec 17 that I hoped to be with you in three weeks -- There was little or no snow then on Christmas Eve, there was a plentiful fall with some exceeding cold weather after it as I ever knew -- the weather for three or four days past has been intolerably warm considering my wishes -- the Thaw has been so severe that I've trembl'd for the Consequences, for without snow my very important charge cannot get along -- I came from Lake George some days ago. In the severely cold weather & suffered by it considerably -- Excepting which altho' I cannot say much for the pleasantry of the Journey yet it has been tolerable -- my brother is now at Lake George Busily engaged in loading the sleds as they come in --

there are a considerable number employ'd in getting them down to this place where If the weather should come cold which I hope for -- they will all be on next Tuesday or Wednesday & the next [Tuesday?] at Springfield & four or five days after at Cambridge -- After I see them all set off from Springfield I shall leave them & push on -- on the wings of expectation & love -- A little about my travels -- New York is a place where I think in General the houses are better than at Boston -- they are Generally of brick and three stories high with the largest kind of windows -- Their churches are Grand their Cottages & [warehouses ?] & [] most excellently situated & also exceedingly commodious. Their principal streets much wider than ours -- The people -- why the people are magnificent in their equipages which are numerous in their house furniture which is fine -- In their pride & conceit which are inimitable, in their profanity which is intolerable, in their want of [] which is prevalent -- In their [——ism] which is insufferable & for which they must repent in Cloth & Ashes -- The Country from New York to this city is not very populous, nor the [filth just ?] so much so as in New England & with much greater marks of poverty than there -- the people of this City of which there are about 5000 or 6000 are I believe honest enough & many of them sensible people, much more so than in any other part of the Government which I've seen there are some very good Buildings for public worship with a State House, the remains of Capital Barracks, Hospital & Fort -- which must in their day been very clever -- It is situated on the side of a Hill the foot of which is wash'd by Hudson River which is Navigable for Vessels of 70 or 80 tons as far as this -- Albany from its situation commanding the trade of the [] & the immense territories westward must one day be [] the Capital yet nearly to it of America There are a number of [Gentlemen ?] very [elegant——?] in view from that part of the river before the town among them I think General Schuyler's claims the preference. It is very large & with a most commanding situation. The owner of which is Sensible & polite & I think behaved with all propriety to the British Officers who by the course of war have fallen into our hands. If there was such a thing as discrimination they must see the infinite difference with which they are treated to which our officers are who are so unfortunate as to fall into their hands -- Seventeen of them set out from this for Pennsylvania Yesterday among whom was General Prescott who by all accounts behaved exceedingly

ill in putting Col. Allen of ours who was taken at Montreal. General Schuyler favor'd me with the sight of a letter which General Washington sent to General Howe in Boston & Mr. Howes answer -- It repeats General Prescott. Gen'l W— tells Gen'l Howe as soon as he gets answers to certain questions of Prescotts treatment of Allen -- that Prescott shall be serv'd in the same manner -- I think Mr. Prescott in a disagreeable situation -- there is also Captain [Barnstre?] who wrote the letters from Quebec which were published last summer -- These were taken as Montreal, St. Johns, Chamblers & Longneil in all about 60 Commissioned Officers -- no tool of Security this for the British folk -- [] about twenty of the Canadian notables who appear as [] & happy as if nothing happen'd -- One or two of the officers I pitied the others seem'd concern'd but not humbl'd -- the women & children suffer amazingly as this advanced season of the Year for being transported in so frozen a climate -- It is now past twelve OClock therefor my [] Lucy I wish You a good night [] & will mention you in my prayers.

Adieu for Tonight adieu"

When one considers the late hour indicated by Knox in his closing, the fact that other letters and notes were made that evening, and the primitive illumination of that era, one cannot complain too bitterly about the difficulty in reading some of his words, especially toward the end. Fortunately these are not especially critical, and with respect to the indecipherable name of the British captain mentioned as having written certain letters from Quebec, we can determine enough to know that this was not Andre.

The points of greatest significance are his summation of the weather, the fact that brother William is still at Lake George loading sleds as fast as they arrive, even at this late date, and his plans for pushing on after they reached Springfield. Beyond this, it serves most as a review of his travel and his impressions of the places he has seen. It would probably serve to clarify matters by making another summary of the more significant matters before going on with the account of the expedition.

Knox departed from Boston, or more specifically, Cambridge, in mid-November of 1775. After a weekend with his wife in Worcester, he arrived a week later in New York where he was both impressed by the magnificence of the city and repelled by the costs and the character of the people. After a two day stay, he hastened north on horseback, staying but one day in Albany before going on to Fort George. He found the land between New York and Albany a rather poor country, which implies that he followed the post road away from the river front and did not visit the more opulent mansions to be found facing the water. Albany on the other hand

impressed him favorably as being both well situated from a commercial and political standpoint as well as being populated by people whom he found to be compatible.

Advancing to Fort George, he made the acquaintance of George Palmer along the way and set up tentative arrangements for employing his services. He does not make it clear how this meeting came about, but subsequent events show that Palmer must have been well known to Schuyler, and not with the favorable reputation that Knox has been led to believe the man enjoyed. At Fort George Knox and Schuyler met briefly -- unfortunately not exchanging information about Palmer so that Knox would avoid any further commitment -- and Schuyler gave Knox a list of material he would get a Fort Ticonderoga. The list was unquestionably the result of an earlier directive received by Schuyler to see what armament he could spare from the defenses of the fort, and later that evening when Knox arrived at the fort, he found the guns being prepared for shipment by being removed from their old, dilapidated carriages and mounts. The next morning he went about getting them out of the fort and up to the landing on Lake George. Time and the threat of heavy weather -- especially the possible freezing of Lake George -- were his enemies at this point, and he was fortunate to beat them.


Accidents did begin to plague his expedition. First was the sinking of the scow by running on a sunken rock and then by being swamped before full repairs were made. However, he was still lucky enough to have this happen in shallow water so that his brother could effect salvage and eventually get the cargo to Fort George. At Fort George, his first enemy was the tardiness of the snow and freezing weather he had hurried to avoid before crossing the lake. His second problem came in the failure of George Palmer to keep his promise to have sleds and drovers with oxen on hand with the first snow. Schuyler, too, injected himself into the problem by voicing his displeasure at Knox's arrangements and, it would appear, by directing Palmer to desist, just in case Knox did not follow instructions to countermand his orders.

Knox hastened south on Christmas Eve to consult with General Schuyler and, in so doing, traveled in the heaviest weather he had seen since starting on his expedition. Arriving at Albany after three days of travel, as compared to two on his northward trip only three weeks earlier, Knox met with the General and then they sent for Palmer. Observing the adamant stand taken by the Stillwater contractor, Knox realized his errors and was forced to agree with the decision to dismiss Palmer. Palmer had anticipated this development and even made veiled threats against the expedition, but developments cause one to question how much Loyalist feeling had developed at this time to make them any real risk. At any rate, some of the drovers recruited by Palmer seemed happy to accept the terms offered by Schuyler, indicating that there is a good possibility that Palmer had offered them no better pay while expecting to pocket the difference himself. This would have been the second known instance of this sort of overcharge, the first

having been revealed by William Knox's letter to Henry warning him too late to pay Captain Johnson before Lieutenant Brown could arrive to collect. By New Year's Eve word came of sleds with horses and drivers going north to Fort George to pick up the cannon.

The first four days of 1776 Knox spent in efforts to strengthen the ice at the four river crossing points on the Hudson. The bitter cold which followed the Christmas storm in which he traveled had already started to dissipate and the ice was not as strong as he felt he needed for safe passage of the guns. The route being followed was the customary one up to this time. From Fort George, the sleds would move along the old military road to what was then the inhabited center of Queensbury, in the neighborhood of Fort Amherst, which would one day become the City of Glens Falls. From there they would pass along the military road to Fort Edward, and then along the east side of the river to the village opposite Fort Miller and on to the ford or ferry near Fort Hardy, a bit north of present day Schuylerville. After passing through that village, then called Saratoga, they would move south across low rolling hills and along the edge of the river on the plain, through Stillwater and on to the usual crossing place at old Fort Half Moon, called the half moon crossing by Knox but also known as Lansings Ferry. After crossing the Hudson for the second time there, they would move south through the village then called New City, later to be known as Lansingburg and then in more recent times incorporated into North Troy. From New City they would go along through the district sometimes called Stone Arabia -- at the risk of confusion with that Stone Arabia where the battle of that name would be fought almost 5 years later -- but now the City of Troy, to cross a third time to Schuyler Flatts, the region now generally known as Menands. The fourth crossing would take place at Albany at what was then called the South Ferry, in the vicinity of old Fort Orange and near where the Dunn Memorial Bridge stands now. Knox has considered alternatives to avoid these crossings, at least in part, but has feared that the road between the Schuyler Flatts crossing and Greenbush (now the City of Rensselaer) would be unreliable, yet fearful that he might have to use boats to cross at Albany, and that there would be none sufficient to carry the heaviest cannon. The ice on the river has given him hope, provided his strengthening maneuvers proved successful and the cold remained with him.

At this point we return to his account covering both the accidents and a most interesting record of his view of Cohoes Falls. However, he has already noted the arrival of the first guns to come from Fort George -- a brass 24 pounder, four eighteen pounders (thus including some of the largest) and a small mortar. Other comments indicate that some other smaller pieces have also arrived, but were not identified beyond his mention of "some few here" in his letter to General Washington. These remarks do indicate that the "four river crossing" route has been useful up to this moment, and cannot be discounted as a mere hope on Knox's part. These 18 pound guns may have included the double fortification types which carried this same shot.



Fort Edward in the vicinity of the Old Military Road which went up this hill at an angle.

VIII

THE DROWN'D CANNON

It is sometimes a bit confusing to note that Knox refers to incidents in such a manner that we know he must have written about them later in his diary, yet fails to mention other things which we are sure impressed him just as much. In this case, we have seen him write an entry dated January fourth referring to letters he sent out dated on the fifth, and in reading the one very long one to his wife, we discovered that he wrote that very late in the evening. The fact that he does not mention his visit to Cohoes Falls therein reinforces our belief that the writing was done on the evening before and/or early by being shortly after midnight. The next entry also being dated the fourth indicates both that the letter to Lucy was composed wherever he stayed at the Half Moon and that the letter to Washington was done much earlier. It also shows how his diary entries must have been made notably after the events, when he found time to sit down and recap the activities.

Continuing his January 4th entry, Knox wrote:

"...In the afternoon much alarm'd by hearing that one of the heaviest cannon had fallen into the river at half moon ferry this Gen'l Schuyler came & inform'd me just as I was going to sit down to Dinner I immediately set out to Allens & went up to the half moon where I reach'd at Dusk & not hearing of the others, & I caring that they would meet the same fate I sent off an express to Sloss's Ferry about 7 miles Distant [and then ?] a Letter to Mr. Schuyler Informing him of my excessive [scepticism ?] Lest the Careless manner in which he carried the Cannon over without taking those precautions which by his Instructions he was bound to have done & by no means to attempt crossing where he was until I came -- the express return'd & inform'd that they had all got safely over -- I then set off another express to Mr. Swartz to cross at Sloss's as the Ice was so much stronger there than at half moon, the usual place of crossing --"

It is at this point in the account where we begin to find some of the more serious debates over Knox's route. The arguments in general involve his comments about four crossings of the Hudson River, which we have seen involved both his own advance run and the first few guns (including the 24 pounder) and was his original plan once he knew for sure that the road from Half Moon to the Village of Greenbush (City of Rensselaer) was impractical; his repeated reference to the "half moon crossing" and the fact that the present day Village of Half Moon is on the Mohawk River rather than the Hudson; the fact that in the years that have intervened, the reference to "Sloss's" has caused untold confusion; and the fact that a little later in the Revolution, the military route was changed to involve the previously avoided crossing of the four outlets to the Mohawk as fords in all but the flood seasons, at which time a detour was made to a later ferry known as Louden's.

The usual contentions are, first, that the guns never crossed at Lansing's Ferry because the first one broke the ice and made the river impassable. We have disposed of this contention, but must agree that, after the accident, the guns were diverted to a Mohawk crossing. Second is the argument that all references to "half moon" had to mean Louden's Ferry. Knox makes it very clear that this is not so -- all references to Half Moon are to the old Half Moon Fort area on the Hudson, and the present village of that name was only part of the over-all Half Moon District, not even recognizable as a village at that time. Also, Louden's Ferry was not established until later when it was a closer crossing for the military supplies when the Mohawk at flood stage would make the fords across its outlets impassable. Later reporters who have contributed to this misunderstanding failed to note the absence of that crossing point on maps prior to the creation of the fords, and have permitted two

other factors to obscure their recognition of Sloss's. First, Knox was not informed as to the proper spelling of Sloss's name, and therefore used a phonetic form. According to Howard Becker, the original ferry was made by Cornelius Claus or Close (both spellings were used) and Claus was one of the early land holders in the Van Schaick Patent as mapped in 1767. Mr. Becker also explains that the "C" was originally pronounced as an "S". When the ferry was bought by Dunsbach a few years later, it became known as Dunsback's Ferry and all these little details were lost in the confusion of the mispronunciation of the Claus or Close name. To further confuse matters, maps have been produced to show historic sites in this area, and by erroneous entry of dates, Louden's Ferry is shown as being operated from sometime in the 1760's until 1777, the time when it actually came into regular use for military purposes.

Mr. Howard I. Becker also pointed out that the account rendered by John Becker (no ancestor) in the Sexagenary states that, after the accident at Lansing's Ferry, the guns "reached the ferry of Mr. Claus the same day, and crossed in safety." Claus's or Sloss's ferry was in the vicinity of the present day bridge that carries the Interstate Route 87 across the Mohawk near Crescent, and the remnants of the approach road can still be seen. However, in the years that followed, the contour of the river has been changed by the construction of dams which have raised the water level. It is said that at the time Knox and his artillery used this crossing, the water was shallow enough for a man to walk across safely in all but the flood seasons, and the need for a ferry was more to provide dry passage for farm goods and comfort than anything else.

In spite of the facts mentioned above, many historians have persisted in the belief that only Louden's Ferry was used, and there is even a small cannon displayed at Fort Ticonderoga which, it is said, was lost by Knox at the Half Moon crossing of the Mohawk River and salvaged after the Revolution was over. The gun may have been one of those carried by Knox to Boston, and it probably was salvaged at the site of the Louden Ferry, but it was not lost by Knox. We have John Becker's assurance that the 18 pounder which went through the ice at the Half Moon crossing on the Hudson was salvaged by using the long line that had been attached so that the horses could draw it from the shore, and which his father had cut to save the animals from being pulled back into the water. We also have Knox's account of the cannon that went through the ice later at Albany being rescued. Not only is there no other mention of guns being lost along the route, but we can be reasonably certain that, after sending two inventories ahead to Washington, Knox would have had to either deliver everything or offer a detailed and satisfactory account to explain any missing pieces. Such an account was not among his papers. Less care seems to have been used by those who were responsible for returning the armament after the British evacuation of Boston.

Some may wonder why the cannon went through the ice at Lansing's Ferry yet crossed safely at Sloss's. John Becker also tells us in his remembered version that it began to rain about the time of the accident, indicating the warmth of the weather that had hindered the ice strengthening efforts. The shallower water at Claus's may well have helped preserve the ice for a time, although the next morning Knox reported it too weak to please him.

New York Nov 17 1775
 paid for keepers
 from Saturday
 to Tuesday forenoon - 1-16
 paid three additional
 from Sunday
 afternoon to Tuesday
 morning - 2-14 to
 paid for subsidies
 narrow saddle - 10-
 glad to leave N York it being
 very expensive -
 paid for 2 days - 12-8
 paid for 1 day - 10-6

Copy of one page from Knox's Diary



View of Cohoes Falls described by Knox

However, it is common for even the deepened Mohawk of today to freeze sooner than the Hudson, stopping barge traffic west sooner than to the north. This has been observed between points less than a mile apart, yet warm air, even at night, can weaken ice.

Knox's visit to Cohoes Falls have always stirred comment because of his extravagant description of them. Some have looked upon his trip to see them as an incidental excursion but as we read his account it is obviously only incidental to his inspection of the alternate route he has been forced to adopt.

"5th I went up the Mohawk river about seven miles & then cross'd over on very weak ice indeed for horses -- I ran down along side the River untill we came to the falls, so famous in this part of the continent & known by the name of the Cohoes Falls Those stupendous Falls inferior to none except the Grand one of Niagara, are serv'd by the whole body of the mohawk River falling at one stretch from a preponderance of eighty feet -- It is the most superb & affecting sight I ever saw -- the river is about 4 or 500 Yards wide, at the time I saw it was about 9 O'clock in the morning when the beams of the sun reflected on the whole icy scene around -- Crust icicles of twenty feet long and three or four feet thick hanging pendent from the neighboring rocks -- which were assembled from the rain & melted snow falling from the neighboring heights & a very severe frost coming up about arrested the Water on its fall -- this ornamented the scene in a very particular manner -- the water falling from such a height gave the water the look of milk. It look'd like one vast torrent of milk pouring from a stupendous height -- In its fall Occasion'd a very thick mist to

arise, which look'd like a shower of rain & I was told that in Summertime a perpetual rainbow was to be seen here after having gaz'd & wonder'd for a long time I return'd to Albany about 12 miles from the admiring the stupendous works of nature & not a little humbl'd by thoughts of my own insignificance

Sunday January 7th Albany

The Cannon which the night before last came over at Sloss's Ferry we attempted to get over the ferry here, which we effected excepting the last which fell into the River notwithstanding the precautions we took, & in its fall broke the ice for 14 feet around it -- This was a misfortune as it retarded the dispatch which I wish'd to use in this business. we push'd the [10 ?] Sleds on which got over safe & then I went to getting the drown'd cannon out which we faintly effected but by seven of the nights coming could not do it entirely.

8th Went on the ice about 8 O'clock in the morning & proceeded so carefully that before night we got over twenty three sleds & were so lucky as to get the Cannon out of the River, owing to the assistance the good people of the City of Albany gave in return for which we Christen'd her The Albany The 9th got several more sleds also some spare span of horses in case of any accident -- After taking my leave of General Schuyler & some other of my friends in Albany I set out from thence about twelve O'clock & went as far as Claverack about 9 miles beyond Kinderhook. I first saw all the Cannon set out from the ferry opposite Albany ---"

In the foregoing entries occurs one of those minor errors of date which have contributed to misinterpretations of Knox's comments. After having told of the accident occurring on January 4th and the convoy having moved on to Sloss's Ferry to cross there the same afternoon, a detail supported in turn by John Becker's recollections, and then his visit to the crossing and the falls the next morning when he found the ice quite weak, Knox's next entry jumps to the 7th and he refers to the cannon having crossed at Sloss's "the night before last" which would have been the evening of the 5th. Knox wrote over his own date, indicating confusion, in his own mind, and he may have meant the night before the night before. On the other hand, we must also remember that he had sent a messenger to Swartz directing him to modify his route in order to cross at Sloss's. This would help explain in part his notable concern over the weak ice, and then if we note the clear weather and correlate this to the yo-yo type temperature changes he has noted in other parts of his reports, we can visualize a cold front having passed over and causing the weather to again turn cold with a resulting

strengthening of the ice at Sloss's to permit the passage of the later sleds. Had he still been using the Half Moon crossing over the Hudson, the deeper water there might well have continued ice too weak to carry the heavy loads.

We also note that the crossing at Albany entailed the safe passage of at least 10 sleds before the second accident, and that he pushed these along toward Cambridge. Since John Becker did not comment on the second accident, it is safe to assume that he and his father had already left Rensselaer and that the occurrence was far enough behind not to have impressed him as had the first. We also note that, after having taken Mr. Schuyler to task for not having exerted sufficient caution, Knox himself suffered a very similar accident. The diary does not mention whether the horses suffered any accident in the process. We would be justified in assuming that similar precautions had been used at this time as Becker had described at Lansing's Ferry, yet the mention of taking along some spares when he left Albany implies that he had not been as fortunate this time.

Knox also reported the safe crossing of 23 more sleds on the 8th, and a few more on the 9th before leaving Albany himself. He further stated that he saw all the guns off from the Rensselaer side before departing himself, which at least implies that William had completed the loading at Lake George and joined him with the last of the cargo by the 9th. However, one should avoid the temptation to correlate these figures with the previous plan to use 40 sleds. When Palmer was dismissed, few if any sleds had actually been delivered, and General Schuyler's wagon master had rounded up not only horses and their drivers, but the needed carriers. With over two hundred horses involved, there is no way to guess at the number of sleighs or their exact sizes. Although Knox had expressed doubts about the sample he saw, some may have been stronger, and a few may have made up in numbers for the smaller guns what they lacked in physical size.

In making his departure from Albany, Knox makes special note of seeing several "other friends" in addition to General Schuyler. His having such significant assistance from Albanians in rescuing his cannon there also raises a question as to how this was achieved, and suggests that Albanians were especially pro-American in their sympathies or that General Schuyler was especially influential in getting their active help when it was needed. The more probable explanation rests in the unspoken, unwritten reliance on Masonic connections that prevailed. Not only was Knox a Mason, member of First Lodge in Boston, but General Schuyler had become a member of the fraternity during the French & Indian War. There seems little doubt but that Knox visited the prominent lodge or lodges in the vicinity of Albany while here, and that when he needed help, he found the brethren quite ready to organize work parties to assist him. His stressing taking leave of his "other friends" must have referred to these new acquaintances with whom he felt more than a casual acquaintanceship.


SWING EAST AND HEAD FOR HOME

From this point on, Knox's own dairy entries become quite sparse, and even John Becker's account does little to supplement except with interesting trivia. This has produced a wealth of unreliable legend which has gained credence simply from repetition, but which fails to withstand any critical questioning. The serious researcher finds himself faced with some of the most adamant, unreasonable resistance when he tries to clarify Knox's route beyond Kinderhook, all based on these local traditions and misinterpretations of what few statements Knox did make.


In his last entry, dated January 9th, Knox stated that, after leaving Albany or Greenbush at noon, he went as far as "Claverack about 9 miles beyond Kinderhook." In spite of this clear reference to Kinderhook, and the extensive claims by other communities to Knox's having passed through their villages on even less evidence, the people of Kinderhook display a remarkable restraint in their viewpoint, admitting that the exact path is not clearly known to them. In his HISTORY OF OLD KINDERHOOK, Edward A. Collier does not even mention this event in the village's participation in the American Revolution. However, he does provide some valuable bits of data which help interpret references on old maps and other sources.

One of the first of these helps settle the question of just what Knox meant about going to Claverack. Contrary to the popular opinion in the present Village of Claverack, this did not apply to the village itself, but to the district. As we have seen, Knox did not state distances greater than he actually went, and inasmuch as the village is at least 5 mile further than the nine miles that Knox said he went, we should look for a better explanation than these local, ill founded traditions. Collier provides the first clue. He says (on page 28) that, in 1772, there were four districts in that area -- Claverack, Kinderhook, Rensselaerwyck, and Livingston Manor. He goes on to explain how Kinderhook had been carved out of the Claverack and Rensselaerwyck territories, the line between Kinderhook and Claverack running just north of Hogeboom's Tavern, and including as part of Claverack much of what is now Ghent. Next, references on a map drawn by Robert Treat Paine, a chaplain with General William Johnson in the expedition against Crown Point, show that in 1755 one of the principal roads from Albany to the Connecticut River ran from Greenbush (now the City of Rensselaer) to a place he identified as Sawmill Tavern, next to Kinderhook Creek, but not in the village of Kinderhook, and then into "Claverick" and Hogeboom's Tavern there, about 8 miles. This route is also indicated on Sauthier's map of 1779.

This route was extensively researched by Joseph Elliott of North Egremont, Mass., before his death, and he had the assistance of Mr. Walter V. Miller, the Historian for Columbia County, in locating the



Knox trail markers as used by State of Massachusetts showing information carved in granite with only a picture cast in bronze.



This was Hogeboom's Tavern now called Broadstairs.



A piece of the old road just east of Kijk Ut Mt.

corresponding roads as they exist in Columbia County in the mid-twentieth century. These gentlemen cite numerous historic facts to counter the contention that Knox meant the village when he mentioned the name of the district of Claverack, but one of the most important points is this matter of mileage. Paine's map indicating 8 miles from Sawmill Tavern to Hogeboom's Tavern, the Sauthier map confirming this route as part of the main road from Albany to Springfield, Mass., and Knox's own statements combine to indicate that the true path must have been along the roadbed of the Boston & Albany Railroad from Greenbush to the place where the old post road veered south toward the Village of Kinderhook (coinciding with Collier's references to this route as the Great New England Road and the directive issued to build a road from Kinderhook to Greenbush in 1723), along the general track of the old post road, close to the present route 9 from the rail overpass to Kinderhook Creek at present day Valatie, then only a part of Kinderhook. Whether this was the site of the old bridge described by Collier as having been built to span the creek in 1719 or 1720 is not known. It certainly has characteristics which would make it desirable for such use, but even if it were not the spot, it was used as a ford by the old sawmill built there in 1712 by Johannes Van Deusen (Collier, page 340) and shown on the Paine map as the Sawmill Tavern in 1755.

Local people say the foundations of the old sawmill still can be seen, but most of the road from that point to the road running east out of the Village of Kinderhook, which Elliott and Miller believed was the route followed to present route 203, has disappeared. An unmarked road just south of the village of Valatie swings over and follows close to the old path to join the Elliott-Miller route near present day 9H. The Paine and Sauthier maps then suggest that, rather than go east to route 203, one should follow county route 21 to an ancient dirt road which parallels county route 21B and joins county route 22 for a few hundred feet before another unmarked road turns east to lead directly to the beautiful old stone building, now known as Broadstairs, which was Hogeboom's. This will place the old inn in the proper location with respect to the road as shown in the Paine map.

From Hogeboom's to Green River, the route would have followed the track laid out by Elliott and Miller with one possible exception. Although there is strong evidence to suggest that the old path followed certain rural roads that exist to this day leaving only once to follow a long abandoned trail which can still be seen, to go to the present village of Green River, and then down along the river to Egremont before turning back northeasterly to Great Barrington, the Robert Treat Paine map does indicate a possibility that the route went to present North Hillsdale, then called Nobletown, and climbed directly east over a road which is not too steep on the west approach, but which descends a very steep trail to the east. This unmarked road crosses the Green River near the Green River Inn on route 71. Even if one accepts the more sensible appearing path marked out by Elliott and Miller to Green River, there is much to suggest that the route did swing more directly east than by going to Egremont. A road bearing easterly from near the Green River Inn

climbs gently and goes directly to Great Barrington. It appears to be both an historic trail and complying with the old maps. The maps do not indicate routing into the quaint and beautiful old village of Alford, although that place was established in 1750, but the road is only a mile away from the hamlet.

Knox had reported a plan to go to Kinderhook, probably to have to get new draft animals there, and then to go "into Great Barrington Massachusetts Bay." The Sauthier map suggests that Great Barrington was more a district than a specific hamlet, and the Paine map indicates that it might have been better known to travelers as Sheldon's Tavern, Sheffield, or sometimes Sheldon's Sheffield, although the village of Sheffield is further to the south today. Regardless of the name that may have been used, Knox's diary entries show that, after spending the night at "Claverack about 9 miles beyond Kinderhook" on January 9th, his travel the next day -- the 10th -- carried him well past present day Great Barrington. This further suggests that he followed the most direct route available with the easiest possible up-grades.

"10th reach'd No. 1c after have climb'd mountains from which we might almost have seen all the Kingdoms of the Earth --

11th went 12 miles thro' the Green woods to Blanford. It appeared to me almost a miracle that people with heavy loads should be able to get up & over such Hills as are here with anything of heavy loads

11th at Blanford we overtook the first division who had tarried here until we came up -- and resisted going any further on account that there were no snow beyond five or six miles further in which space there was the tremendous Glasgow or Westfield mountain to go down -- but after about three hours perseverance & hiring two teams of oxen they agreed to go."

Knox's diary ends at this point except for one receipt, probably in reference to this hiring of oxen.

"Blanford Jany 13 1776

Rec'd of Henry Knox eighteen Shillings blanket money for Carrying a Cannon weighing 24.3 from this Town to Westfield being 11 miles

18 Sh

Solomon Brown"

Knox's reference to reaching "1c" is clarified by Paine's map which refers to "Brewers No. 1", by mileage somewhere near present day Monterey. Mr. Wallace Tryon, a fifth generation descendent in that village who has prepared a local history, points out that Brewer had built a frame house, now seen on route 23, by that time, but that his first cabin on Brewer's Pond nearby was still in use then as a waystop for travelers on the old road.

References to the views of "all the Kingdoms of the Earth" imply having to climb very high hills between Hogebooms and No. 1, yet even now as one drives this route and discovers that the grades are not too steep, one can still be impressed by the spectacular scenery on a clear day. Climbing from Great Barrington eastward today is another matter, and one can imagine the problems that Knox and his drovers faced on the old path, now largely vanished, that made it seem a miracle to him that they succeeded at all.

John Becker's account includes mention of a two day delay in Claverack as the result of a breakdown. It was this sort of thing that had made the drovers decide to stick together for mutual aid after the occurrences at the rivers had impressed them with the dangers to a lone team. The fact that Knox did not mention the incident probably comes from both the fact that such breakdowns were not unexpected to him as long as they proved to be repairable, and the further fact that if the Beckers were among the first sleds to leave the Greenbush side of the Hudson River on January 7th, they would have been moving on again before Knox caught up with them. It would seem that they were among those who were waiting for him at Blandford, although John Becker does not mention this.

Instead, Becker did go on to tell of their reception at Westfield, where he says the people from all around gathered to examine and comment on the guns while offering the drovers refreshments of cider and whiskey. One can well imagine the impression made on a lad of 12 who, probably for the first time in his life, was being treated as a man among men and one of those whose achievements in carrying the heavy guns over such hills was well worth the praise offered by the wondering crowd.

Although Knox's diary ended with the entries at Blandford, the available data does not end entirely at that point. There is a brief certification signed by Mr. Schuyler, and a last letter by Knox at Blandford that tells us a little more.

"Westfield January 12 1776

*This is to certify that Liut. Gray has rode Cannon
Seven Miles*

-----W26-0-0

Har Schuyler

Aj D: I: Genl"

"Blandford Sunday Morning

Jan 14, 1776

To W. Twast

Sir

I have waited at this place 2 days for some of your people to come up -- But as the roads are so bad that they all cannot come on 'till evening I have concluded to go to Springfield -- I am afraid from some circumstances that they will not trust to go farther than this place, if so I shall be oblig'd to get

teams there and at Westfield -- I had much rather they would go on to Camp. the roads are good and they can purchase fodder in the upper Towns for Horses & in order to induce them to it offer them 14/Yoke Oxen & a day for each span of horses that is after they leave Springfield -- After they get down the next hill they will be able to travel much faster than Oxen -- I shall wait for you at Springfield In the Interim

*I am Sir
Your Obedt Serv
Henry Knox*

If you should want any assistance from the Country people or employ them I will pay them at Springfield"

It is clear that Knox knew the feelings of the drovers who had been with him so far, but that he hoped to save himself the trouble and possible delay of having to find new men and animals if he could coax them into going all the way. The Beckers were not induced, and we cannot help but feel some regret. After his entertaining description of the reception at Westfield, one must believe that John would have been quite overwhelmed by the way they would have been greeted at Cambridge. Instead, we find him ending his recollections with a sad commentary that they left the guns "lying in the mud" at Springfield. We can be sure that Knox did not let them be dumped in that manner, and that Becker is merely commenting on the fact that the sleds had no snow on which to travel while a warm thaw turned the earth into a soft mire in which the sleds appeared to be sinking as he and his father headed back to Saratoga.

It may be of some interest, before concluding this account, to clarify the numerous references to various members of the Schuyler family which have appeared in this record. Few will have any question about General Philip Schuyler. It is perhaps fortunate that Knox did not give Colonel Schuyler's first name, or many would have found confusion between the two and might have thought that Knox was referring to the same man but mixing up his rank -- both were named Philip, and they were second cousins. There has been some question about Mr. Schuyler, the D.I.G., as referred to several times by Knox, and there was a temptation to think that this might have been the Colonel. However, the fact that he signed the certification with respect to Lieutenant Gray with an abbreviated form of his first name has made it possible to consult with one of the Schuyler descendents who has maintained family records in such matters. "Har" is believed to be his abbreviation for "Harmanus", and this would identify him as second cousin to both the General and the Colonel. He became a resident of Stillwater about the time of the Knox expedition. There is no information to indicate whether he might have been brought into the expedition by George Palmer, or was assigned by General Schuyler when he found out about Palmer and had doubts about the wisdom of the decisions being

made. The latter option seems most logical, for Harmanus did use a modified military title in his duties, and Knox also referred to him as "the D.I.G."

The road from Great Barrington to Westfield was, without doubt, a rugged one. The original path can be seen in places, although it has been long abandoned. The modern traveler who wishes to follow this part of the route will use present route 23, but he must keep in mind that he is only running along a roughly parallel trail today. Nevertheless, the narrow, winding, often steep modern highway will give him a feeling of kinship with those early drovers who had a more rugged forest path through which to haul the heavy guns under conditions which made Knox comment in wonder at how they could have ever gotten their cargo up to Blandford.

The road down from Blandford over route 23 is a steep one. Although Knox used a trail which was supposed to have been used by General Amherst in the French and Indian War 15 years or so before to haul supplies from Boston to Albany, and would have thereby avoided impassable climbs, the drovers did hesitate to negotiate the steep grade down until Knox arranged for two span of oxen to supplement their horses in controlling the sleds. Local people today enjoy pointing out a series of cliffs above the south branch of the Westfield River, telling how Knox had to lower his cargo over this with block and tackle. This is done with a distinct twinkle in the teller's eye, as none really believes he would have followed such an impassable road. If it had happened, we can be sure that Knox would not have missed the opportunity to cite the event as one more great obstacle overcome in his effort to deliver the cannon.

These cliffs are commonly called "The Devil's Staircase", and even if Knox did not traverse them, he did pass near enough to them over a series of descending levels that some have also called by this same name. As they dropped down from the higher elevations, Knox reported that the snow disappeared. The sleds had to be hauled into Westfield over virtually bare ground, and the reception in that town proved to be a welcome respite. Knox himself did not consider the visit worth commenting upon, although John Becker did, and in turn told how Knox was so impressed by the fact that every militiaman present seemed to hold a commissioned rank to the point that they were all chiefs with no braves to do any work.

Although Knox had been trying to get the drovers to all go on to Cambridge rather than to have to try to find new animals and men to haul his guns, many of them refused to go east of the Connecticut valley. The arrival in Springfield seems to have taken place about the 16th of January. Becker told how he and his father then headed back to Saratoga, regretfully seeing their great cannon lying in the mud. We can attribute some of this to a romantic memory that Becker had, perhaps being a bit regretful himself that his father

would not go on to Cambridge, for Knox would surely have resisted any move to dump the guns off of the sleds. He had already insisted that the carriages they were put upon would carry them all the way, and at most he would have only allowed a direct transfer from sleds to wagons, protecting his precious cannon in every conceivable way. Knox had anticipated only 4 or 5 days journey from Springfield to Boston for his cargo, but it seems to have taken a few days more, and part of this may have been wasted in trying to find replacement carters to complete the job.

Why did the New Yorkers refuse to complete the journey? No one seems to have taken the trouble to explain this, yet it was not entirely unexpected to Knox. Some local stories even insist that many of the drovers refused to go as far as Great Barrington, fearing that the fierce "Green Mountain Boys" would harm them without regard for whether they were Dutch, English, or transplanted New Englanders who had settled in New York after the French and Indian War. The area from Green River to the Connecticut was disputed territory, although New York was not pressing its claims, based on the grant of everything west of the Connecticut, insofar as Massachusetts and Connecticut lands were concerned. These areas were already too well penetrated by the respective southern New England colonies. It was only what is now Vermont that had come under direct challenge between "Yorkers" and those who still viewed that as "The Hampshire Grants". On the other hand, the Green Mountain Boys, who had all been declared outlaws by New York authorities, were not just from Vermont -- they included men from western Connecticut, Great Barrington area, the Pittsfield region (where Ethan Allen had relatives), and up around Fort Massachusetts in the area that is now Williamstown and North Adams. If the drovers were fearful, they probably viewed their recent passage as having occurred under an unspoken truce recognizing their performance of a patriotic mission, and were anxious to effect a safe return while this aura of good will still prevailed.

It is regrettable that the rest of the journey did not receive the same careful reporting as the first part of the trek. The combination of the failure of map makers of that era, and/or those who provided copies of their works for general use (using as their excuse that the region east of the Connecticut valley was too well settled to need such services) and Knox's own justifiable confidence that the road from Springfield to Cambridge would be easier, leaves us wondering just what did occur. Knox's confidence was based on both the easier terrain of gentle, rolling hills, and the fact that he had been over it only a short time before on his trip to New York. But did he have snow to help him? Or did he have to drag the sleds over bare ground? The fact that there has been an implication of no snow at Springfield does not preclude the possibility of a good fall in that season of the year in eastern Massachusetts. On the other hand, if the weather had turned warm, he might have had problems negotiating the soft ground in the frequently wet -- almost boggy -- areas of that region.

Details about the route also remain something of a mystery. Knox mentioned in his letter to W. Twast at Blandford that there would be little difficulty in getting fodder in "the upper Towns" east of Springfield. Not only does this imply a swing further north than the present route 20 by Sturbridge, but most present day researchers seem to agree that he followed a path that moved up toward present route 9 into Worcester, and this seems to concur with his own earlier 38 mile trek from Worcester to Western.

Several maps have been located to supplement the Sauthier and Paine maps. These help clarify some of the vague landmarks in the mountains, but more importantly have helped determine the principal route in eastern Massachusetts. This has enabled laying out a fairly accurate path for the entire road including the eastern section. The appendix covers this for the reader who may wish to retrace the trek (or any part of it), perhaps to take his own choice of photos to complete this book to his own satisfaction.

Just exactly when Knox delivered his "Noble Train of Artillery" to Washington is debatable. Some insist it was on January 24th, yet others indicate that the arrival was almost as drawn out as the start from Fort George. Some say that he made a token delivery of the first guns, suggesting that these came in a few days earlier or were gathered for the purpose while the bulk were brought to a holding point several miles west of Cambridge until the disposition could be agreed upon. Whatever the case, we find that we have only one positive thing from Knox in the microfilms, a letter dated January 25th indicating that he was back then and a Colonel in the Regiment of Artillery, ten days after having left Blandford. This is the first time that he signed his correspondence with this rank, although he had been so addressed by others. This letter puts a period to his account of this great adventure.

"Cambridge Jan 25 1776

To General Lee

Sir

His Excellency General Washington informs me that he has written to you in general terms expecting a quantity of shot & shells that were order'd from New York some time since, also desire me to write more particularly -- I do myself the honor to inclose a list of those articles which were to have been forwarded to Camp by the provincial congress or Committee who sit during the recess of Congress -- why they have not the reasons for it are unknown to me -- The Stores are at Turtle Bay, the Cannon at Kings Bridge excepting the 2 brass six pounders which belong to the City and were promis'd as a loan -- If they could be put on board some small Vessel & sent thro the East river to New London or Norwich the expence of carting would be very much dimins'd altho I brought 11 very fine field

pieces from Ticonderoga Yet without the additional ones from New York we shall be deficient in field artillery -- the shells & c are much wanted -- The General has desired me to send an Officer of Artillery Accordingly I have order'd Capt. Badlam an officer of merit considering his experience to serve You immediately. I have the honor to be with the greatest respect Sir Your Most Obed Hble Serv

Henry Knox
Col of the Regiment of Artillery"

A footnote to the expedition comes in the following invitation. We feel sure that Washington took this opportunity to offer his personal expressions of appreciation and congratulations to Knox for his successful mission, and to further cement the personal friendship and brotherly Masonic relationship which had been on a cautious footing lest the young book dealer should have proven more of a promise than a successful achiever.

"The General & Mrs. Washington present their Compliments to Col. Knox & Lady, Beg the favor of their Company at dinner, on Friday half after 2 O'clock.

Thursday Evening
Feb 4 1776"

EPILOGUE

Many have asked, "What ever happened to the guns brought from Fort Ticonderoga under such difficulties? Were they actually used? And how were they disposed of after the British left Boston?"

The usual answers to these questions seldom seem to satisfy most who ask them. It is regrettable that as accurate records were not maintained afterwards as Knox did during his expedition, but we can say that some cannon were placed in positions around the city, the most famous site being at Dorchester Heights where the longer range pieces could command most of the harbor and the docking area of Boston, thus blockading the main channel. The usual story stresses the dismay of the British on arising to see guns pointing down their throats from positions which had been bare the night before. There is also an account of a brief bombardment, not resulting in any significant damage, to enforce in the minds of the English the weakness of their position.

But Washington's camp at Cambridge was infested with Loyalist sympathizers and informers. His own personal physician was later found to have been a spy who made his escape with the British as they evacuated the Loyalists in the retreat. Thus the story that the consternation of the British began when it was first reported that Knox had arrived with his noble train of artillery warrants due consideration. The "impossible achievement" in the dead of winter having taken a little longer than something merely difficult, the British must have been aware that their time in Boston was drawing to a close. The placement of the guns and any token barrage -- many of the weapons were never fired at this time -- must be viewed as simply the crowning move in the game which the British had to concede in the spring of 1776.

What happened after the British left Boston? Some of the guns were borrowed from other cities which now wanted them back, along with others if they could get them. Some field pieces must have moved with the Regiment of Artillery in its further transitions. And some were returned to the place from whence they came, to invest those positions from which they had been divested. However, the care exhibited by those charged with these shipments was far less than that used by Knox in his expedition preceding the victory. Some seem to have become souvenirs of the towns along the way. A few seem to have been lost at river crossings and became the basis of misleading legends.

But the guns Knox took from the fort on December 6th, 1775, were delivered and performed their prime duty in the spring of 1776 -- the removal of the British from Boston.


APPENDIX

The Knox diary justifies the belief that two routes were used from Fort Ticonderoga to the landing where the boats were loaded on Lake George. Knox specified that the heavy guns were put aboard a gundaloe to be moved by water to the bridge by the lower end of the portage, yet language used in several places indicate that some were hauled overland.

From the foot of the portage, a railroad spur follows an easy grade up to the head of the stream. This was probably the route used by Knox, and a narrow street closely parallels this today.

The landing place described by Knox was shown on old maps of the town as "French Landing", about 100 to 200 yards down stream from the place where Water Street and the road called "The Portage" join today. Another "Old French Landing" was on a point a mile or two further south, but too far to fulfill Knox's description.

Exact duplication of Knox's route across the lake requires the use of a boat, but a casual traveler can follow N.Y. Rte 9N and enjoy magnificent views of the important spots mentioned by Knox as well as of the lake itself. Dams in the outlet control the level of the lake several feet higher than in Knox's time, and this obscures some of the rocks he had to avoid as well as making the one hit by the scow several feet deeper today.




Knox did not identify the rest area where his boatmen stopped and they took a nap, but logical reading of the data he gives suggests that it must have been in the vicinity of The Narrows. It could have been either on the shore at the foot of Tongue Mountain, on the eastern shore near Shelving Rock, or even on one of the islands in the Narrows where it was logical for them to cross the lake.

Subsequent studies of Lake George have revealed that, when the wind is out of the south, surface currents flow north on the west side of the Narrows, but underwater topography cause a reverse current to flow southward along the eastern shore. Knox's boatmen would have known this as a rule of thumb and would have utilized it to help them overcome the direct effect of the wind itself.

From Fort George to Fort Edward, Knox and his artillery train would have used the old military road, close to present route 9 as far as Halfway Brook where Fort Amherst stood near the present Glens Falls City Line, then generally across what are now house lots in the city to the old railroad roadbed, along that to Dix Ave., and then east on Dix until they passed the ravines and then directly toward Hudson Falls and along the level stretch to the hill down into Fort Edward.


Route 4 from Fort Edward to Fort Miller closely parallels Knox's route. In some places, traces of the old road can be seen as a double line of trees across farm fields.



Knox's first crossing of the Hudson River is not sharply defined, but was probably in the vicinity of the place where Burgoyne later had his Bridge of Boats just north of Fort Hardy. This would be somewhere near the Schuyler School in the vicinity of Thomson. Some old timers say that one can still see the ramps of the original ford when the water is low and the canal locks all open for winter drainage. There was supposed to have been a "McNeal's Ferry" near here; in any event, Knox reported dining at "Arch McNeal's, Saratoga" on the afternoon of the day before Christmas.

South of Schuylerville, the old road has been replaced by a new concrete highway, and except for short stretches such as Old River Road past the site of Ensign's Inn where Knox spent Christmas Eve, most of it is cut into dead-ended sections little more than private driveways. Ensign's is gone now, merely a vacant lot with the ruins of some barns.

By following Route 4, the casual visitor will parallel the route used by Knox and his guns through Stillwater to the site of old Fort Half Moon where Knox's second crossing of the Hudson took place, and where he suffered the first "Drown'd Cannon" that forced those following to be diverted up the Mohawk to "Sloss's Ferry". A good view of the site of Lansing's Ferry, called by Knox "the usual crossing place", can be had from the road just south of the marker for the old fort. The modern traveler may choose to follow Knox by crossing the Hudson by the bridge at Waterford, then go




down through Troy to the Menands Bridge to cross the Hudson for the third time, or he may wish to follow the path used by the last part of the train by going up the old military road (Fonda Road) and along the bend in the Mohawk toward the site of "Sloss's" or, later, Dunbach's Ferry. In the latter case, the easiest crossing will be by the Route 9 bridge at Crescent, yet the 1-87 bridge is closer to the original route.

The more critical visitor will want to back-track to the southern side of the Mohawk at Blaine's Bay Marina, which is as close as one can approach the original ferry landing. This can be found by using the Dunsbach Ferry Road. From here one may either follow the route of the guns south over Dunsbach Ferry Road and Old Latham Road to join the "Four river crossing" route near the I-90 Patrol Island Bridge, or use Knox's inspection route to see Cohoes Falls.

The "fourth" Hudson River crossing, and site of the second "Drown'd" cannon, was near the Dunn Memorial Bridge, at the foot of South Ferry St. From the City of Rensselaer (Knox's Village of Greenbush), the path followed a route later used to construct the roadbed of the Boston and Albany Railroad. Some traces of the road can be seen, and country roads can be used which take one close to and sometimes along the old trail.

Route 9 from near the Boston & Albany RR overpass to Valatie is a close approximation of the original path. Knox probably passed the last of his guns to leave Greenbush (Rensselaer) by the time they reached the crossing point of the Kinderhook creek by the old





sawmill which stood opposite the now idle Wilder Mill. The old road on the opposite bank is gone, along with other landmarks that Knox knew, but it joined a country road that still runs from the Gun Club to the street that runs east out of the Village of Kinderhook. From that point, a few yards east of the bridge that overpasses for Route 9H, country roads still follow closely the track followed by Knox and his guns as they went into the district of Claverack near present day Ghent.

The building which Knox knew as Hogeboom's Tavern still stands, a beautiful private home facing eastward onto N.Y. Route 66. Knox himself stopped there for his first night after leaving Albany, and then followed the country road eastward that was the main highway to Boston in his time. Most of this road can still be used, although in some places one can see where the original piece has been left as a private turnout to some homes or farms as the main road cuts off an extra bend or two.

After crossing the Taconic Parkway as Harlemville Rd, the path runs along a stream, past that hamlet, and up toward the pass at Kijk Ut Mountain. Coming through that pass, the original route turned off to the left on what now seems to be a private driveway into a poultry farm office, but actually is part of a dirt road leading directly toward the headwaters of the Green River. The old maps clearly establish this route, and only a short piece just before reaching the westerly branch of the head of Green River, is impassable today. This is north of North Hillsdale -- Nobletown in Knox's time -- and offered Knox advantages that existing roads today would not.

After crossing Green River and following its east bank a short distance, a road bearing more easterly led the train to the top of the ridge between the villages of Alford and North Egremont. The road is still in use and with only a hard surface added to what was its original form shows that the climb was not arduous, and would have led them directly into Great Barrington much more easily than




the roads which became the post roads later and, perforce, went into each hamlet. The old maps clearly indicate this to be the main highway in that time.

Knox crossed the Housatonic River a little north of the present bridge in Great Barrington, and then went directly east along roads which are a combination of village streets and country lanes today, running parallel to present Route 23. In some places, such as the remnants of the old village which was Tyringham or South Tyringham in his time, but is now part of Monterey, one can see that these trails are useable only in summer months or by hikers and snowmobiles in the winter.

After leaving Hogeboom's, Knox next stopped at what he called "No. 1c". This, further investigation has revealed, was also called "Brewer's No. 1", and referred to Brewer's first cabin beside Brewer's Pond just north of present Monterey. Brewer had already built his more palatial home that is now on Route 23 in Monterey, but he kept his first cabin as a regular way stop for travelers on the main road which then went by his pond and up the valley now flooded and marked on modern maps as Garfield Lake.

Moving east from Brewer's, Knox and his train followed a path which joined the present Route 23 for a short distance before bearing south near Otis and following trails that run parallel to the present highway, crossing valleys and streams which, in some cases, have since been flooded as reservoirs. In the course of doing this, Knox passed through a dense pine forest which was marked on the old maps as "The Greenwoods". There must have been a trail through these trees, but his drovers may have had to widen it in places to allow their heavy laden sleds safe passage.

Tradition also says that they passed between the Spectacle Ponds, but a careful examination of the old maps and modern topographical surveys suggest that the route may have passed south of the lower pond. Local tradition also says that they went between Big Pond (then called "26 Mile Pond") and Benton Pond, but the old maps also suggest that he was a little further south at this point. The casual traveler today will probably follow Route 23, known as "The Knox Trail", as the easier parallel road.




Present day Blandford seems to have been the place where Knox found the first section of his train awaiting his arrival, although in his time the village of North Blandford was considered the main center. The old schoolhouse, beautifully restored, still stands at the top of the hill by the junction of Route 23 and the road to North Blandford. The old church further along the side road was built several years later by the congregation which was organized in Knox's time and used another building in 1776. Local legend says he used the churches (there were two or three at the time), and it seems quite probable that he would have used the schoolhouse as an "office" while there.

From Blandford, the road descends the steep eastern side of the Berkshires over a series of drops known as "The Devil's Staircase", a dangerous path for his sleds and well justifying the employment of two span of oxen to control their movement. Today's visitor will follow Route 23 down to General Knox Road in Russell, then turn right over that to pass the Moses Boy Scout Reservation through which the original road passed beside Russell Pond, then down the successive levels to the plain on which the city of Westfield stands.


At Westfield, the old road crossed the Westfield River and roughly followed part of the roadbed of the railroad toward the Connecticut River. The old maps indicate that, before reaching the Connecticut, the road bore a little to the north to approach a crossing point near the outlet of the present Bear Hole Reservoir, which would place it in the vicinity of the Old Chicopee Bridge (now closed) and the present I-91 bridge rather than down near the railroad bridges and Route 20 crossing from West Springfield to Springfield.


From the Connecticut River crossing, they followed a road toward Ludlow. Today, this would be part of the city street system of Springfield and the surrounding cities which almost merge into one without distinctive boundaries. The old maps indicate two possible roads from the vicinity of Ludlow. One required crossing the Chicopee River at that point and traveling along its north bank; the other went along the south bank to cross the Quaboag River at



Palmer. A visit to the area today strongly signifies the greater desirability of staying south of the Chicopee unless very strong bridges had been built to eliminate having to move the heavy sleds down steep embankments to the river and up again on the opposite shore.

The Quaboag is a smaller, more shallow stream easily forded, and the old maps indicate a straight line road crossing the river into Palmer, then by-passing the bend in the river to cross the stream again at a point close to the present path of the Massachusetts Turnpike, from which it went directly overland to a spot on the south side of the Quaboag near Brookfield. Pieces of this road still exist, although some authorities question its use by Knox on the grounds that the river crossing into present day Brookfield would have required crossing a marsh. This viewpoint ignores two factors, either of which could have prevailed. First, in January, the marsh could have been frozen solid. The second and greater probability lies in the fact that, south of the Quaboag at Brookfield is a tract identified by signs as "The Quaboag Patent" dating from 1660, and the old maps sometimes suggest that this may have been the main center of Brookfield in those times. From there, Knox would have






gone further east to a crossing point between the two lakes that feed the Quaboag River. This ground seems to be (and have been) relatively solid with a good ford, even if the water had not been frozen solid, and not too wide. The possibility of good ice is strong in that the current between the lakes is not fast, being rather nearly still at this place.

This area between West Brimfield and Brookfield is now divided between the townships of Brookfield and Brimfield, but in Knox's time this was a separate small township known as "Western". Knox made specific reference to this in his diary covering his journey from Worcester to New York in November of 1775, and the old maps clearly designate the region and its part in the old route from Worcester to Springfield in those times.


From East Brookfield to Worcester the route followed closely the present path of Route 9, passing through the villages, or what were the original centers, of Spencer, Leicester, Cherry Valley, and into Worcester itself.

The present traveler would probably follow U.S. Route 20 from Springfield through Palmer to Mass. Rte. 67, and then along that around the bend in the river to Rte. 9 at Brookfield, and then along Rte. 9 to Worcester.

At Worcester, the old maps clearly indicate that the old road went across what was then called Worcester Pond, and what is now Lake Quinsigamond, in the vicinity of the present bridge for Rte 9. Whether they had a good bridge there in those times, or had built a causeway, or whether they used a ferry unless the lake were solidly frozen is not at all clear. However, there is no question that the old maps designate a crossing of the pond or lake as the path of the road. From there, rather than going into the present center of Shrewsbury, the maps indicate that a road went up that way, yet the main highway which Knox would have used went directly toward Westborough, then swung up toward (but not into) Marlborough,



following Mass. Rte 30 instead to Newton, and then working northward to Watertown. Whether Knox delivered all his guns to the camp at Cambridge, or merely made a token delivery there while keeping the main body of them at Watertown has been a point of question. Knox repeatedly wrote of planning to take them to "Camp at Cambridge", but we have seen that plans and final action sometimes differed for good reason. Whatever was done, in effect Knox delivered them as anticipated, and when the mounts were ready, the hardware was mounted and the pieces placed along the lines where they would have the greatest effect on the British in Boston.



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"A Plan of the Roads Between Boston and Albany Surveyed by Order of the Governor, in Pursuance of a Resolution of the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay, by Fras: Miller, 1765."

French Map of 1777, "Carte de Theatre de la Guerre Entre les Anglais et les Americains."

Map 16 in Jeffrey's American Atlas of 1775.

Map printed in London on Sept. 2, 1775, entitled "The Seat of War in New England by an American Volunteer with the marches of the several corps sent by the Colonies towards Boston."

The Claude Joseph Sauthier map, "Chorographical Map of the Province of New York" as printed in England in 1779, based on surveys conducted in 1771-1774.

The Robert Treat Paine manuscript map of 1755.

Book of maps published by Howard I Becker, entitled "Maps of the Lower Mohawk".

